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This paper deals with the problems concernmg 
Holocaust Denial as a special form of hate speech on 
the one side and freedom of expression on the other side. 
Firstly, it discusses Holocaust Denial in general to 
provide an overview why it is considered as hate speech. 
The author then discusses the procedural differences in 
various jurisdictions to examine the problems arising 
out of the prosecutions. Furthermore, the author gives 
an overview over the different legal frameworks and 
cases. Finally, the paper discusses freedom of 
expression in general, and free speech in combination 
with hate speech in particular. The paper concludes with 
an analysis whether New Zealand' s hate speech 
provisions are sufficient to combat Holocaust Denial. 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, appendix, bibliography, 
content and footnotes) comprises of I 5, I 68 words. 
IV 
I INTRODUCTION 
During the course of writing her book Denying the Holocaust: The 
Growing Assault on Truth and Memory 1 , the author Deborah Lipstadt was 
invited to several television and radio shows to debate her book with Holocaust 
deniers. However, she refused to appear on these shows, stating that this would 
only lead to create "a debate that is no debate and an argument that is no 
argument'? This illustrates one of the dilemmas of battling Holocaust deniers. 
Actual rebutting their assertions might give them a forum to repeat their claims, 
ignoring them leaves the assertions unanswered. At least for some people, 
factual engagement with Holocaust Denial is "an unpleasant necessity"3 
With the exponential growth of the Internet, Holocaust Denial is 
becoming increasingly pervasive4 . Still , one might think that Holocaust Denial 
is not a real problem. But is that really the case? 
A The "Hayward-Controvert,y" 
In May 2000, then little-known Massey University historian Joel Hayward 
suddenly became famous . He was the centre of a controversy regarding his 
master thesis written in 1993 at the University of Canterbury and graded with 
A+. In his research about revisionism Hayward came to the conclusion that 
there was no evidence that there was ever an official Nazi policy to exterminate 
Jews, that Nazi gas chambers may in fact have fallen into the category of 
"atrocity propaganda" , and that far fewer than six million Jews died at the hands 
1 Deborah Lipstadt, Deny ing the I !olocaust : The Growing 1.Jssa11/t on Tmth and Me11101y 
(Penguin Books, London, 1994 ). 
J Ibid, vii-vii i. 
3 Robert Kahn Holocaust Denial and the Law (Pa lgrave McMillan, New York, 2004) 12. 
1 Credence Fogo-Schensul "More Than a River in Egypt: Holocaust Denial, the Internet, and 
International Freedom of Expression Norn1s" ( 1997) 33 Gonz L Re,· 241, 242 . 
of the Nazis5 . Seven years later this thesis caused so much controversy that 
Hayward apologised for what he called a work "without sufficient knowledge 
and preparation" 6 and the University of Canterbury installed a working party to 
determine if Hayward should be stripped of his Master ' s degree. 
The working party however came to the conclusion that Hayward could 
not be stripped of his First-class honours degree although they described his 
work as "flawed" and "faulty". The working party report7 caused even more 
disturbance, raising such questions as scientific freedom and freedom of speech 
and ultimately even led to a petition to the University of Canterbury signed by 
numerous New Zealand lecturers8. 
B Problem Outline 
There can be no doubt that Hayward' s piece of work was infamous, that it 
was faulty and that it contained every single element of what is known as 
Holocaust Denial: A lie that is "not offensive solely to Jews and members of 
other groups that were victims of Nazi crimes. It is offensive to all who are 
informed about the facts of the Holocaust"9 . However the question remains how 
such a piece of work and Holocaust Denial in general should be dealt with. 
Dealing with this matter has to take into account the importance of freedom of 
1 Sean Scanlon "Making Ili story" (20 May 2000) The Press, Chri stchurch (archived at 
http://www.nizkor. org) ; Rebecca Walsh "A+ equals anger fo r Jewish groups" (22 December 
2000) ava il able at http ://\\1n1 .1vheral<l .co .nd (last accessed 28 September 2008). 
6 Rebecca Walsh "A+ equals anger for Jewish groups" (22 December 2000) New Zea land 
IIera ld. 
7 
" Joel Hay\\ ard Working Party ''Report to the Council of The Uni versity of Canterbury" (20 
December 2000) ava ilable at http :/111 \\ \\ .eantcrburv.ac .nz/hm 11 arc.I (last accessed 28 September 
2008). 
8 
Martin La lly "Petiti on to the Uni versity of Canterbury" available at 
http ://\\\\\\ .ioe lh a111 arc.I.corn (l as t accessed 28 September 2008). 
9 
Anthony Julius "Combating l lolocaust Denial through law in the United Kingdom" (2000) 
JPR 3 avai lable at http://1n1 \\ .jpr.org.uk/Reports/ (las t accessed 28 September 2008). 
2 
expression, which is, as stated by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 
a fundamental right 10 : 
The fundamental right to free expression of opinion is, as the most direct 
expression of human personality in society, one of the foremost human 
rights of all ... . For a free democratic State system, it is nothing other than 
constitutive, for it is only through it that the constant intellectual debate, the 
clash of opinions, that is its vital element is made possible .. .. It is in a 
certain sense the basis of every freedom whatsoever, " the matrix, the 
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom" . 
This research paper aims to examine Holocaust Denial and the free speech 
issues it raises. It will give a broad overview on the way legislation and courts 
in the European Union (and Germany in particular), Canada and New Zealand 
deal - and are supposed to deal - with the problem. Finally, the paper will focus 
on the significant freedom of expression issues of regulating hate speech in 
general, and Holocaust Denial in particular. 
II WHAT IS HOLOCAUST DENIAL? 
The history of the European anti-revisionist laws can be traced back to the 
time-period that immediately followed the Second World War. During that time 
period, the Axis Powers felt obligated to banish the propaganda and the 
displays of the Nazi regime 11 . Admittedly, there are several different forms of 
anti-revisionist laws, but most if not all of them have in common that they not 
only ban the outright denial of the Holocaust, but also the minimisation and 
justification of the Holocaust 12. Therefore not only the denial that the Holocaust 
happened is threatened with criminal penalty, but also statements that try to 
10 Lueth vHarlan (Lueth-case) (15 January 1958) BVerfGE 7, 198,208. 
11 Edward N. Peterson The .. lmerican Occupation of Germany: Retreat to I "icto,y (Wayne State 
UniYersity Press, 1978) 138-66 (discussing ho" the United States used the process of 
denazification during occupation). 
12 Emanuela Fronza "The Punishment of Negationism: The Difficult Dialogue Between Law 
and Memory" (200 I) 30 VTLR 609, 6 19. 
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minimise the nature and extent of the crimes by the Nazis or which try to justify 
those crimes towards Jews and other minorities, like Communists, homosexuals, 
mentall y ill and prisoners of war, to just name a few 13 . To fully comprehend 
why all these forms of "denial" are included, it is crucial to understand the 
history, origins and nature of Holocaust-denial itself. 
The first examples of denial took place immediately following the Second 
World War, when those allegedly responsible for the actions of the Nazi regime 
and its policies tried to defend and justify their contribution with statements 
claiming that atrocities had not been as bad as reported or that they had no 
responsibility for them 14 . 
However, in the 1960s Holocaust Denial reached a new level with what is 
considered "modern Holocaust Denial literature" today 15 . The first publication 
was ''The Drama of the European Jews "16 by so-called French historian Paul 
Rassinier. Surprisingly, Rassinier was a well respected historian who himself 
was imprisoned in a concentration camp (Buchenwald) for being a socialist. He 
claimed that the idea that there had been a "Holocaust" had been invented by 
Zionists and the allied forces to validate their own policy 17. However, Rassinier 
based his allegations primarily on unsupported assertions and on so-called 
evidence that was more than dubious 18. Nevertheless, his ideas where largely 
the basis and inspiration for a second generation of deniers, with the most 
significant pieces of work being Arthur Butz' s The Hoax of the Twentieth 
Century: The Case Against the Presumed Extermination of European Je11JJy 19 
13 lbid. 
1
·
1 
Marvin Perry & Frederick Schweitzer, Anti semiti sm : Myth and llate form Antiqui ty to the 
Present (Palgra\'e Macmillan , 2002) l 77. 
15 
Peter R. Teachout "Making lloloca ust Denia l a Crime: Refl ections on European 
Anti nega tionist Laws from the Perspecti ve of U.S. Constituti onal Experience (2006) 30 VTLR 
655 , 66 1. 
16 
Pa ul Rassinier "The Drama of the European Jews" (Michael Hardesty trans, 1975). 
17 
Richard Evans '' Lying about I lit/er: I !istot;v, 1!0/oca11st and the David Irving Trial" (Basic 
Book, 2002) , 128, 135 (citing Rassinier) 
18 Ibid, l l 8. 
19 
Arthur Butz The !Joax of the Twentieth Centu1y: The Case r1gainst the Presumed 
Extermination of European Jew1y (Theses & Dissertations Press, 1976) . 
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and David Irving ' s Hitler's War 20 . Those two books have set the stage for 
others, and have also introduced the major themes which characterize 
Holocaust Denial2 1• 
Furthermore, the publishing of these books ultimately led to the founding 
of the Institute for Historical Review in 1979, which is dedicated to prove that 
he Holocaust is a "myth"22 . Although the journals, books and articles published 
by the Institute cover a multitude of topics, it specialises in questioning the 
Holocaust23 . Although the Institute's official policy is that it "does not deny the 
Holocaust", but would rather provide a forum to discuss legitimate " revisionist 
history", a quote from the Institute's journal states24 : 
There is no di spute over the fac t that large numbers of Jews were deported 
to concentra tion camps and ghettos, or that many Jews died or were ki lled 
during World War II . Revisionist scholars have presented evidence 
showing that there was no German program to exterminate Europe's Jews, 
and that the estimate of six million Jewish wartime dead is an irresponsible 
exaggeration . The Holocaust -- the alleged extermination of some six 
million Jews (most of them by gass ing) -- is a hoax and should be 
recognized as such by Chr istians and all in fo rmed, honest and truth ful men 
25 
everywhere. 
The director of the Institute is quoted with another expression of the 
Institute ' s perspective, stating that " [i]f by the 'Holocaust' you mean the 
20 David Irving Hitler 's War (World War II Books, 1977). 
2 1 Peter R. Teachout "Making Iloloeaust Denial a Crime: Reflections on Europea n 
Antinega tioni st Laws from the Perspective of U.S. Constitutional Experience (2006) 30 VTLR 
655, 662 . 
22 Richard Evans ''lying about ffitler: f-li stm:v, lloloca11st m1d the David Irving Trial ·· (Basic 
Book, 2002) , 148. 
}~ [bid, 149. 
2 1 IIerrnan Otten, Chri stian Responsibility to Truth , J HIST REV, Sept/Oct 1993 , 32 . 
25 The author feels the need to strongly repudia te that allegation. 
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political persecution of Jews, some scattered killings, if you mean a cruel thing 
that happened, no one denies that":26 _ 
Although there is some form of disagreement what exactly should be 
deemed as "revisionist" theses, those theses are generally spoken ones which 
claim one or more of the following: :27 
• That the Nazis did not use gas chambers to murder millions of Jews. 
• That most of those who died at concentration camps such as Auschwitz 
succumbed to diseases such as typhus rather than execution. 
• That although crimes may have been committed against the Jews, the 
Nazi leadership was unaware of the nature and extent of those crimes. 
• That it is a gross exaggeration to say six million Jews were killed. 
• That trumped-up atrocities against the Jews were used cynically to 
generate political support for the expropriation of Palestinian land to create 
a Jewish homeland. 
• That the number of Jews killed in the so-called Holocaust pales in 
companson to the number of dissidents and Christians killed in Soviet 
gulags. 
• That academics are afraid to speak the truth about these matters for fear of 
being charged with anti-Semitism 
Nearly all of those assertions - with probably the exemption of the last -
are contrary to known historical facts and are not accepted by respected 
historians. Additionally, it is widely appreciated that the claims lack 
credibilit/8 . 
'.!
6 Peter R. Teachout '·Making Holocaust Denial a Crime: Reflections on European 
Antinegationist Laws from the Perspective of U.S. Constitutional Experience (2006) 30 VTLR 
655, 663; (again, the author wished to repudiate) 
'.!
7 Michael Shermer & Alex Grohman Denying Histo,y: ll'ho Says !he 1/olocausl Did Never 
('appen and ll'hy Do They Say II (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2002), 40, l 00, 106. 
- Peter R. Teachout "Making Holocaust Denial a Crime: Reflections on European 
Antinegationist Laws from the Perspective of U.S. Constitutional Experience (2006) 30 VTLR 
655, 663. 
6 
There have been some efforts to differentiate between clear Holocaust 
Denial and legitimate historical revisionism 29 . The main difference between 
those two is that the latter try to focus on areas "for which the evidence is 
incomplete or ambiguous", such as "Hitler's role in the event, Jewish responses 
to persecution, and reactions by onlookers both inside and outside Nazi-
controlled Europe"30. The former group however focus their attention to facts 
that are clear and try to dispute the main features of the holocaust. According to 
one scholar: "Unlike true scholars [Holocaust deniers] have little if any respect 
for data or evidence. Their commitment is to an ideology and their 'findings' are 
shaped to support it" 31 . 
The problem with Holocaust Denial is therefore not only that it is bad 
history, but that it is bad history that furthermore encourages and serves racist 
and Nazi propaganda. A close look at the ideology of Holocaust deniers will 
support this thesis . 
It is widely agreed among scholars that denial is blatantly racist. The 
widespread view 1s that "those promoting Holocaust Denial are 
overwhelmingly anti-Semites and/or neo-Nazis" 
32
. One example is known 
revisionist David Irving, who brought a libel suit against Deborah Lipstadt for 
her allegation that he had forged evidence to support his theses
33
. Although 
Irving' s work has been described as being an important contribution to our 
understanding of the Third Reich and the Nazi regime - in fact, his research 
was praised as being "thorough and painstaking research into the archives"
31 
-
his work was also described by Charles Gray J as persistently and deliberately 
misinterpreting and manipulating historical evidence for his own ideological 
29Ibid, 664. 
30 Donald Niewyk (cd), Introduction to T11e Holoca11st: Problems and Perspectives of 
Interpretation (2ed, Wadsworth Publishing, 1997) 1,7. 
31 Deborah Lipstadt "Deniers, RelatiYists and Pseudo-Scholarship'', [ 199 1] 6 Dimensions 4. 
32 Tom W. Smith ''The Poll s--A Review: The Ilolocaust Denial Cont roversy", [ 1995] 59 PUB 
O Q 269, 270 
33 !rving v. Penguin Books, Ltd. , No. 1996-1-111 3, [2000] EWCA QB 11 5 
34 Ibid, para 13.7. 
7 
sake. Additionally, he had portrayed Hitler in an unjustifiable positive light and 
would be an active Holocaust denier; that he furthermore was an active Anti-
Semite and racist and bonded with extremists who promote neo-Nazism 35 . 
lrving' s true nature is revealed by some of the comments he made during the 
course of the years 36: 
I don't see any reason to be tasteful about Auschwitz. It 's baloney. It's a 
legend . Once we admit that it was a brutal slave camp and a large number 
or people died elsewhere in the war, why belie \'e the rest of the baloney? I 
say, qui te tastelessly in fac t, that more women died on the back sea t o f 
Edward Kennedy's car at Chappaquiddick than e\'er died in a gas chamber 
in Auschwitz. 
There are so many Auschwitz survivors go ing arow1d, in fact the number 
increases as the years go past, which is biologically very odd to say the 
least. I'm going to form an Association of Auschwitz Survivors, Survivors 
of the Holocaust and other liars, or the ASSHOLS. 
These comments are in my eyes so far out of line - in fact they can only 
be described as cruel and ugly and filled with pure hate - that they deserve no 
further comment and speak for themselves. 
Ill THE CHALLENGE OF BATTLING HOLOCAUST DENIAL IN 
COURT 
A Tlte "Holocaust Denial Trial" 
Aforementioned Holocaust denier David Irving sued Deborah Lipstadt 
and her publisher, complaining that she had defamed him in her book Denying 
3
' Ibid, para 13. 167 . 
36 Gene Lichtenstein, Illusions at the L.A. Times, JE WISH .I. , Jan. 14, 2000, ava ilable at 
http ://digbig.com/4qnxq; Ian Traynor et al. , Three Yea rs ls Not Enough Say lrving's Accusers, 
GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 22 , 2006, at 4, ava il able at http ://(Jigbigcom/4rfvv (last accessed 
28 September 2008) . 
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the Holocaust-The Growing Assault on Truth and Memor/7. She had accused 
him of skewing data to reach unreliable conclusions. Therefore, she had to 
prove in court that the Holocaust happened to defeat him. She did so in a legal 
battle that lasted about 5 years, presenting numerous experts. In a very careful 
judgement that runs over 300 pages, Gray J rejects every single aspect of Mr 
Irving' s case. 
At first glance, it appears however shocking that the defendant actually 
had to prove in court, by testimony of numerous experts, that the Holocaust did 
happen. As there have been numerous finding of fact about the Holocaust and 
courts before that had to deal with the Holocaust38, there is a strong argument 
that the Holocaust is a historical fact and that the onus of proof should have 
been limited to the issue whether Irving skewed data. 
B The Systematic Distinction between Common Law and Civil Law 
Countries 
Common law countries like the United States, Canada, Great Britain and 
New Zealand on the one side and civil law countries like the European 
continental countries (eg Germany, France and Spain) and Latin American 
countries on the other side are not only - speaking in terms of legal systems -
divided by the source of law. They are also divided by the norms of criminal 
procedure39. The first distinction means that in common law countries the law is 
created by the judges through precedent as opposed to civil law countries, 
where the law is created by the legislator, with the judge being reduced to a role 
37 Irving v. Penguin Books, Ltd , No. 1996-l - l l 13, [2000] EWCA QB l 15. 
38 Gerald Tishler, Alan Dershowitz, /\rthur Berney et al "Debate: Freedom of Speech and 
Holoca ust Denial'' (l 987) 5 Card L R 559, 563. 
39 Robert Ka lm f-fo/oca11st Denial and the Lalt' (Pa lgrave McMillan, New York, 2004) 13. 
9 
where he solely applies the existing law40 . The second difference is however far 
more interesting for the purpose of this paper. 
Common law countries have adversarial norms of criminal procedure. 
This means that evidence is presented by the parties of the trial - prosecution 
and defence - while the role of the judge is reduced to being a mere umpire41 . 
The underlying ideal is that " law is a game", and the courtroom is the scene for 
that game. The objective of the criminal procedure is to ensure that the result of 
the trial is fair, even if the truth is not completely uncovered by the prosecution. 
The supporters of this system rely on John Stuart Mill ' s argument that the truth 
is most likely to come out by a clash of ideas which are presented by the 
prosecutor and the counsel of the defence42 . 
Civil law countries on the contrary have established an inquisitorial 
system. This means that evidence is gathered by the judge, who is the centre of 
this system, who presents the evidence and also questions the witnesses43 . The 
objective of the law is the discovery of truth, and the criminal trial is a quest for 
the truth. As the word " inquisitorial" derives from the Latin word "quaestio", 
which stands for "torture", the extent to which the judge will go to explore the 
truth is indicated44 . Furthermore, the underlying principle of the inquisitorial 
system is the supremacy of truth over fairness to the accused, which is however 
not to say that the system is unfair to the accused. 
Critics of the adversarial system have indicated that it would advance lies 
and falsehood, and that trial by jury would contain of "khadi justice" 45 . 
4° For an overview see: John Ilcnry Merryman The Civil Law Tradition: r-ln Introd11clion to the 
Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin r1 111 erica (2 ed, Stan ford, Stanford Uni versity Press, 
198 5) 
11 
Robert Kahn Holoca11s/ Denial and the Law (Pa lgrave McMillan, New York, 2004) 13. 
4
~ Stephan Landsmann The :ldversmy System: t-1 Description and Defcnse (American Enterprise 
Institute, Washington DC, 1984). 
43 
Mirij an Damaska The Faces of Justice and State rluthority: r-1 Comparative r!.pproach to the 
Legal System ,(Ya le Uni versity Press, New IIaven, 1986) , 3-6. 
44 
Robert Kahn I !oloca11s / Denial and the Law (Pa lgra ve McMillan , New York, 2004) 13 . 
45 
Max Weber Economy and Society , vol 2 (Berkely, University of Ca li fo rnia, 1978) 81 3. 
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Additionally, there is the argument that the adversarial system would lead to the 
coaching of witnesses as well as the debate of experts in courts, and that these 
problems were prevented in an inquisitorial system with a much more active 
judge46 . A growing number of voices in the United States call for a reform of 
the current adversarial system47 , and one commentator has stated (regarding the 
Zundel trial) that there was clearly "something wrong with viewing adversarial 
jurisprudence as an efficient tool for arriving at the truth"48 . 
The differences between the systems mirror the dilemma of proof, which 
is described as "the tension between the huge mass of facts documenting the 
Holocaust and a legal system that must give both sides a chance to tell their 
story"9 . Given the huge difference between the systems, there should also be a 
difference in how courts have been willing to use the doctrine of judicial notice 
- which allows the court to recognize certain well-established facts as true - to 
the Holocaust. This part of the paper will therefore examine how and why 
courts in the different jurisdictions have been willing - or not willing - to apply 
this doctrine. It will also examine how courts solved the dilemma of requiring 
on the one hand prosecutors to prove the guilt of the accused and on the other 
hand preventing deniers from spreading their hate in a courtroom. This of 
course goes back to the problem outlined above: That a public debate with a 
denier might be more harmful than ignoring him50. 
46 John Langbein "The Gem1an Adva ntage in Ci \' il Procedure'' ( 1986) 6 1 NWULR 823. 
47 Ell en S,, ard ''Values, Ideology and the E\'o lution of the Adversary System" ( 1989) 64 INDLJ 
30 1. 
48 Lawrence Douglas ''Policing the Past: I loloca ust Denial and the Law'', Robert Post (ed) 
Censorship and Silencing: Practises of C111!11ra/ Recognition (Getty Institute, Los Angeles, 
1978), 78. 
49 Robert Kahn J-Ioloca11st Denial and the law (PalgraYe McMillan, Ne" York, 2004) 14 . 
so Ibid . 
] 1 
C The Inquisitorial System in Germany and the Holocaust 
In Germany, Holocaust Denial prosecutions began as early as the mid of 
the 1970s, and were a mirror of how central and omnipresent the Holocaust and 
accounting for the past still were in German public life5 1. The rejection of the 
Nazi past and of Anti-Semitism was one of the founding principles of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and was even more important regarding the fact 
that many former Nazis played important roles during the early years of the 
Republic. Germany felt an urgency to prove that it had truly changed, and the 
denial of holocaust threatened that image. Consequently, Holocaust Denial was 
and is regarded as a "breach of rules"51 . For Germans, Holocaust Denial is not 
just an historical argument. It is not only a "clever" form of Anti-Semitism, but 
rather and much more dangerously an affirmation of the Nazi past and its 
ideology53 . 
In dealing with the Holocaust, two factors eased the aforementioned 
"dilemma of proof'. The first factor is that one of the underlying reasons for the 
prosecution of Holocaust Denial is not only the falsity of the statement, but also 
the danger that statement poses to society. Therefore, the judges could take 
judicial notice of the Holocaust without ultimately resolving the case. It 
allowed a debate about the dangerousness of Holocaust Denial without having 
to discuss the claims made by deniers54 . 
Secondly, and far more important is the inquisitorial nature of the German 
legal system. Under Section 244 of the German Criminal Procedure Code the 
judges is required to "explore ex officio all facts and evidentiary materials 
51 Ibid. 
51 Rainier Erb "Public Responses to J\.ntisemitism and Right-Wing Ex tremism" in I!crmaim 
Kurthen , Werner Bergmann and Rainie Erb (ed) 1-lntise111itis111 and X enophobia in Germany 
after Unification (Oxford University Press Oxford 1997) 218 . 
~3 ) ' 
Robert Kalm Holocaust Denial and the Law (Palgrave McMillan , New York, 2004), 15 . 
51 lbid , 16 
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which are of significance for the verdict" 55 . The roles of prosecution and 
defence counsel are however limited and the judge has the possibility to reject 
evidence on specified grounds like lack of relevance 56 . Additionally, and 
significant in the context of Holocaust Denial prosecution, the judge may reject 
evidence that is "superfluous on grounds of Offenkundigkeit"57 . The doctrine of 
Offenkundigkeit applies to facts that are common knowledge, which means 
"facts of which rational people generally have knowledge or about which they 
can inform themselves easily from generally available sources without the 
requirement of specialist knowledge" 58 . The prerequisite of the knowledge 
being easily accessible is based on democratic theory. This means no less than 
that the accused who had facts against him established as offenkundig must 
have had a reasonable chance to become aware of those facts 59. 
Although the system of Offenkundigkeit might appear somewhat similar 
to the common law approach of judicial notice, there are significant differences. 
While the common law takes judicial notice only of very specific bits of 
information like dates, place names or the weather 60 , German courts take 
Judicial notice of much more general facts , like the fact that the German 
Communist Party "is an organization whose goals and acts directs itself against 
the constitutional order"61. 
55 German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO), s 244 (2) (translation by author). 
56 Ibid , s 244 (3) . 
57 Ibid, s 244 (3). The etymology of the word "Offenkundigkei t'' (o ffen=open and k.,mdig= 
knO\ n) descri bes the ra ti onale of the la\\ . 
58 Decision of the Federa l Constitutional Court of Gennany, BVerfGE 10, 177, 183 (translation 
by author) . 
59 Ra inier Kell er ''Offenl.1.mdigkeit und Beweisbeduerftigkeit im Strafprozess" (I 989) 
Zcitschrift fucr di e gesamte Stra frechtswisscnschaft 398, 402 . 
60 Graham Lilly 1ln Introduction to the Law of Evidence (3ed, West Publi shing Co, St Paul, 
1996), I 3. 
6 1 Lutz Mcycr-Gossner Strajprozessord111111g (46ed, Munich, Beck, 2003) 843 . 
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D Distinguishing from the Adversarial System? The United States 
Generally speaking, the adversarial system is deeply entrenched within 
the United States. All the more surprising is the success Mel Mermelstein had 
in convincing two courts in California to take judicial notice of the Holocaust62 
The case concerned a promise by the Institute for Historical Review (IHR) to 
pay $50,000 reward to anyone who could prove that Jews were gassed at 
Auschwitz. Mermelstein wrote a letter to the editors of the LA Times and 
others including The Jerusalem Post. The Institute for Historical Review wrote 
back, offering him $50,000 for proof that Jews were, in fact, gassed in the gas 
chambers at Auschwitz. Mermelstein, in turn, submitted a notarized account of 
his internment at Auschwitz and how he witnessed Nazi guards ushering his 
mother and two sisters and others towards gas chamber number five. Despite 
this, the IHR refused to pay the reward. Mermelstein subsequently sued the 
IHR for breach of contract, anticipatory repudiation, libel, injurious denial of 
established fact, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and declaratory 
relief 
The noteworthy fact about this case is less the outcome of the case -
which led to a settlement on the eve of the trial in 1985 - but more the fact that 
Johnson J took judicial notice of the Holocaust, stating that63 : 
Under Evidence Code Section 452(h), thi s court docs take judicial notice of 
the fact that Jews were gassed lo death at the Auschwitz Concentration 
Camp in Poland during the summer of 1944. It just simply is a fact that 
fall s within the definition of Evidence Code Section 452(11). It is not 
reasonably subject to di spute. And it is capable of immediate and accurate 
detennination by resort lo sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. It is 
simply a fact. 
62 
A!er111elstein v IHR LA County Superior Court No C 356 542 (filed 19 February 1981), 
available at http ://frank .mtsu.edu/-baustin/rc, ision .htm . 
63 Ibid . 
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However, that ruling is hard to explain. It appears to be in violation of 
America' s common law system, which traditionally leaves factual issues for the 
jury64 . Then, on the other hand, the question may be raised whether a court 
would not be also willing to accept that slavery happened, that Japanese were 
detained during the Second World War or that American soldiers were captured 
and tortured during the Vietnam war, all equally undisputable historic facts . 
E Canada: Unwillingness to Take Judicial Notion oftlie Holocaust 
In the case against Canadian denier Ernst Zunde)65 (which I will talk about 
m detail later in this paper), Locke J refused to take judicial notice of the 
Holocaust. Therefore Zundel was able to use his two trials to spread denial 
propaganda. Most of his evidence - including, for example, testimony that 
Auschwitz had a swimming pool - came in to show that Zundel, accused of 
"knowingly spreading false news," had an " honest belief' in the propaganda he 
disseminated. The decision by Locke was criticised as creating the impression 
that the Holocaust was not an indisputable fact, as stated by Canadian law 
Professor Irwin Cotler66 : 
Could the courts have taken judicial notice of the exis tence of the 
Ilo locaust as a historica l fac t? As many of you know, judicial notice is a 
principle of evidence; courts are authori zed to take judicial notice of 
matters which are common knowledge and about which reasonable people 
would agree. One wo uld ha\'e hoped, indeed argued, therefore, that the 
Holocaust is at the very least such a matter. One might dra\\ a disturbing 
in ference if judicial noti ce of the Holocaust was not taken: Maybe the 
Holocaust isn't a matter of common knowledge and it is not a matter about 
which reasonable people would agree. 
6-1 Robert Kahn Holocaust Denial and the Law (New York, Palgravc McMillan, 2004), 25 . 
65 R v Zundel [ 1987] 35 DLR (4ti') 338, 
66 Gera ld Tishler, Alan Dershowitz, Arthur Berney et al "Debate: Freedom of Speech and 
!Iolocaust Denial" ( l 987) 5 Card L R 559, 562 , 563 . 
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It must however be observed that Locke J had no intentions to dispute the 
historic facts of the Holocaust whatsoever67. Rather, he felt the obligation to 
weigh the obviousness of the Holocaust against the defendant's right to fair trial. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with Locke J's reasoning, stating that68 : 
[Il f the jury on the evidence concluded that the existence of the holocaust 
was so notorious as lo be indisputable by reasonable men and women, that 
would be a circumstance, but only a circumstance, from which the jury 
might infer that the appell ant knew that the pamphlet was false, but the jury 
would not be required lo draw that inference. However, if the trial judge 
had taken judicial notice of the existence of the Holocaust, he would have 
been required lo so declare to the jury and direct them to find that the 
Holocaust existed, which would have been gravely prejudicial to the 
defence in so far as it would influence the drawing of the inference 
concerning the appellant's knowledge of the falsity of the pamphlet. In our 
view, the judge exercised his discretion judicially in refusing to take 
judicial notice of the I Iolocaust. 
In the end, Locke J's refusal to take judicial notice of the Holocaust had 
nothing to do with sympathy of the weird ideas of the accused. Although the 
decision might not be indisputable, Locke J's decision was more about legal 
fairness towards the accused then about truth. And while that might not be the 
most favourable outcome, it is at least comprehensible. 
F Interim Result 
To no surprise, the courts in the above discussed legal systems arrived at 
different results to the problem. However, what might be a little bit surprising is 
the fact that the distinction did not rely as heavily as expected on the distinction 
between common law and civil law, but rather more on the differences between 
67 
Robert Kahn Holocaust Denial and the Law (New York, Palgrave McMillan , 2004) , 38 . 
68 R v Zundel [ 1987] 35 DLR (4 th) 338, 393 . 
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adversarial and inquisitorial system 69 . As a summary it can be said that it 
depended on three factors whether the judge would be willing to take judicial 
notice of the Holocaust: Firstly the evidentiary norms, secondly the procedural 
nature of the case at stake, and finally the political or social pressure. In the 
American case, the civil nature of the case allowed the judge to take judicial 
notice, as there were also other issues to be solved. The criminal nature of the 
case lead the Canadian court to the refusal of taking judicial notice, while the 
combination of inquisitorial system and politician and social pressure forced 
German courts to find a way to avoid discussing the Holocaust in court. 
Professor Irwin Cotler once commented "that in every case in the United 
States or elsewhere, which involved suspected Nazi war criminals, there have 
been findings of fact about the Holocaust"70. Therefore he suggested that courts 
should use these precedents as a starting point to take judicial notice of a 
Holocaust. In my opinion this is an idea worth thinking about, as it limits one of 
the biggest dilemmas of battling Holocaust Denial in court: That it might be 
used as a forum for deniers to spread their hate even further and publicly. 
IV THE APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
European Union treaties impose a duty on the European Union to respect 
and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens. This is deemed 
to be a general principle of law in the European Union 71 . One of these 
fundamental rights is the freedom of expression, and all citizens of the 
European Union are to be free from unlawful interference by public authorities 
of the European Union 7:. Nevertheless, there have been occasions where 
69 Robert Kahn !!oloca11st Denial and the l aw (N ew York, Palgrave McMillan, 2004), 44. 
70 Gerald Tishler, Alan Dershowitz, Arthur Berney et al " Debate: Freedom of Speech and 
Holocaust Denial" ( 1987) 5 Card L R 559, 563. 
7 1 Treaty Establishing the European CommLU1ity, 10 November l 997, 1997 OJ (C 340) I , 103. 
72 Ibid , art 10. 
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regulations banning expression have been upheld by European courts 73 . Just 
recently, the ministers of the Council of the European Union have attempted to 
strike a reasonable balance the quest to regulate speech while valuing the 
freedom of expression. This was done through a framework of a regulation that 
is designed to combat racism by outlawing certain forms of expression 1 1. 
A The Framework 
Following a senes of racist and xenophobic motivated events all over 
Europe, the Commission of European Communities delivered a proposal to the 
Council of the European Union in November 2001 . As various international 
agencies were seriously concerned about the origin of the events, the proposal 
was to create a framework for a regulation criminalizing certain forms of racist 
and xenophobic speech and to apply this regulation to all European citizens 75 . 
The Commission - which is said to be independent, as it is made up a 
member from each Member State and the members are said to be independent 
as they are prohibited from "seek[ing] [or] tak[ing] instruction[] from any 
government or from any other body" in the performance of their duties 76 -
studied and analyzed reports dealing with effects of racism and xenophobia77 . 
Not only did they find that in virtually every member state of the European 
Union ethnic and racial minorities were subject to violent and hate related crime 
and discrimination 78 , but that also only few of the assaults were actually 
reported to authorities because the victims feared retaliation and were generally 
73 
See/ landyside v. United Kingdom ( 1976) I ECT-IR 737 , 754 
7
~ Council Framework Dec ision on Combating Certain Forms and Ex pressions of Rac ism and 
Xenophobia by Means of Criminal La \\ , art . I, 26 February 2008 
75 
Commission Proposa l for a Council Framework D~cision on Combating Racism and 
Xenophobia, at 2, COM (200 I) 664 final (28 No\'ember 2001). 
76 
Trea ty Establi shing the European Community, 10 November l 997, 1997 OJ (C 340) I, 103 , 
art 2 13. 
77 
Commission Proposa l for a Council Framework Deci sion on Combating Raci sm and 
Xenophobia, at 2, COM (200 1) 664 final (28 November 200 1) at 2. 
78 ' Ibid, at 3. 
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dissatisfied with the way authorities handled them
79
. As the Commission's main 
function is - alongside the guarding of treaties and execution of policy - the 
proposal of new legislature, the Commission addressed those problems by 
proposing a legislative framework which aimed to reduce racist and xenophobic 
feelings in Europe and particularly the number of assaults resulting from those 
feelings 80 . Since the Commission found that racism and xenophobia were (and 
are) severe violations of the fundamental principles of liberty, democracy and 
respect for human rights 8 1 , they suggested the criminal prosecution of 
aforementioned speeches by all member states
82
. 
However, it took almost six years until the ministers of the Council of the 
European Union were able to reach a consent on the framework decision
83
. As it 
stands now, all intentional expression used to incite violence or hatred for racist 
or xenophobic purposes will be criminalized under the wording of the 
framework84. Additionally, the framework provides for the criminalisation 0£8° 
79 Ibid. 
Publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivializing 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in 
the Statute of the International Crimina l Court (Articles 6, 7 and 8) directed 
against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by 
reference to race, colour, reli gion, descent or national or ethnic origin, and 
crimes defined by the Tribunal of Nuremberg (Article 6 of the Cha1ier of 
the Internationa l Military Tribuna l, London Agreement of 1945) directed 
against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by 
reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. 
80 Ibid, at 2. 
8 1 Ibid, at 2. 
82 Ibid, at 6. 
83 Press Release, Counci l of the European Union, Framework Decision on Racism and 
Xenophobia (I 9 April 2007), available at http / /rcgi stcr.cowilium curopa cu/ 
84 Ibid . 
85 Ibid . 
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It is however within the member state ' s discretion to "choose to punish 
only conduct which is either carried out in a manner likely to disturb public 
order or which is threatening, abusi ve or insulting"86 . 
For reasons of parliamentary scrutiny, the framework still has to be 
formally adopted by the Council87 . There is however a general expectation that 
remaining reservations will vanish, and that the law will be adopted soon88 . 
From that point in time, all member states are required to follow the framework 
decision and to implement the proposed provisions into national law within two 
years, thus providing for national law with punishment of imprisonment 
between one and three years89. 
It has been stated in the press release that both the Commission and the 
Council are of the view that neither the fundamental rights of European Union 
citizens nor the fundamental principles of European Union law, including the 
right to freedom of expression, have been modified by the framework decision90. 
They opined that racism and xenophobia were "direct violations of the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law" 9 1 which were the basics for the foundation of the 
European Union and which are included in the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union of 199292 . Both the Commission ' s proposal as well as the framework 
decision by the Council reflect the idea, that if racist and xenophobic expression 
86 Ibid. 
87 
Jolm J. Garman "The European Union Combats Racism and Xenophobia by Forbidding 
Expression: An Analys is of the Framework Decision" (2008) 39 UTOLR 843 , 845. 
88 
Press Release, Council of the European Union, Framework Decision on Racism and 
Xenophobia ( I 9 Apri l 2007) , a,·ai lable at http ://reQistcrconsilium .curopa .cu/ 
89 [bid. 
9° Commission Proposal fo r a Council Framework Decision on Comba ting Rac ism and 
Xenophobia , at 2, COM (200 I) 664 final (28 November 200 I) at 2. 
9 1 . ' Ibid , at 2. 
9" T - reaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, 1992 OJ (C 224) I, 11 992] I CMLR 7 19, 3 1 
ILM 247. 
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would be accepted as protected under free speech doctrines, those very 
principles of the European Union would be endangered
93
. 
However, the framework decision has received notable criticism. It has 
been commented that it is an attempt to regulate speech which is protected by 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms as well as the European Union Charter94 Though all member states 
had enacted some sort of legislation that condemned hate speech in some way 
prior to the framework decision, those legislations varied heavily amongst 
member states. Unsurprisingly, most criticism comes from countries whose 
legislation would be affected the most95 
B Freedom of Expression as a Fundamental Freedom in the European 
Union 
1 European treaties and law 
The European treaties guarantee the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression%_ The primary sources for the European Union law are the European 
Community Treaty97 and the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
98
. However, 
those treaties are not the only source of law. As the first European Treaty, the 
"Treaty of Rome"99 did not explicitly mention any general legal principles and 
as it did not refer to fundamental freedoms, the European Court of Justice - as 
the supreme authority concerning all aspects of community law - was required 
93 Press Release, Council of the European Union, Framework Decision on Racism and 
Xenophobia ( 19 April 2007), a\'ai lable at http://rcgistcr.consilium .europa .cu/ 
9
~ John J. Gam1an "The European Union Combats Racism and Xenophobia by Forbidding 
Expression: J\n Analysis of the Framework Decision" (2008) 39 UTOLR 843, 846. 
9
' John J. Garman "The E uropean Union Combats Racism and Xenophobia by Forbidding 
Expression: An Analysis of the Framc\1 ork Decision·· (2008) 39 UTOLR 843, 846. 
96 Convention for the Protection oflluman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art . 10. 
97 Ilann Margalit Maazcl ''What Is the European Union" (2002 1 16 BYU J Pub L 243 . 
98 John J. Garn1an "The European Union Combats Racism and Xenophobia by Forbidding 
Expression: An Analysis of the FramC\\ork Decision" (2008) 39 UTOLR 843, 847. 
99 Treaty of Rome Establi shing the European Economic Community, [ 1957] 298 U .N .T .S. 11 . 
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to establish law by developing those principles by means of case law and 
reference to fundamental rights and freedoms 1° 0 . Therefore, the European Court 
of Justice developed case law to aide in fields where there was a lack of law. 
This law was described by a former president of the European Court of Justice 
as "a general criteria which may be transposed from one case to another" 10 1 and 
which can be102: 
[f] ound in a number of genera l lega l principles whose aim and effect are 
both to guarantee the freedo m of action gi\'en to the authority and to place 
such res triction on it as are necessary in order to a\'oid arbit rariness. 
Historically, the European Court of Justice relied mainly on Articles 220, 
Article 230 (1) and Article 288 (2) . While Article 220 states the duty of the 
European Court of Justice to ensure the observation of the law through 
interpretation and application of the treaty 103 , Article 230 (1) states that the 
courts have the right to check acts of the community's institutions for lacks of 
competence, procedural requirements or general failures concerning the treaty 
or any rule of law or other misuse of powers 104 . In addition, Article 288 (2) 
forces the community to pay compensation for damages which were caused by 
its institutions in cases where no contractual liability is applicable. This is done 
by referring to "general principles common to the laws of the Member States" 105 . 
However, that changed with the recognition of the requirement to respect 
fundamental rights - now Article 6 (2) of the Maastricht Treaty of the European 
Union - pursuant to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as a general principle of the law of the 
100 Jo hn J. Garman '·The European Union Combats Rac ism and Xenophobia by Forbidding 
Expression: An Analysis o f the Framework Decision" (2008) 39 UTOLR 843, 847-848. 
10 1 
John Ti llotson, Nigel Foster Text, Cases and Materials on European Union law (4cd, 
Ro utl edge Cavendish, London, 2003) 223 . 
102 Ibid. 
103 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, 10 November 1997, 1997 OJ (C 340) I, 103. 
art. 220. 
10 1 Ibid, art. 230 (I) . 
105 Ibid, art. 288 (2) . 
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European Union. The law was amended to recognise that under general 
understanding the European Union was founded on the principles of democracy, 
liberty and the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms as well as the rule 
of law'06 . Therefore, the European Court of Justice now uses three different 
sources when developing new principles of laws: Firstly the legal system and 
constitutional history of the member state, secondly the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and thirdly the 
European Community Treatyw
7
• 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms lists in Articles 2 to 18 the main rights and freedoms w
8 
which are common to all members of the European Union and the Council of 
Europe. Freedom of Expression is ensured in Article 10 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
stating that 1°9 : 
[E]veryone has the right to freedom of expression . This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers . 
However, under Community law the freedom of expression is not an 
absolute freedom and is subject to "formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society"' IO_ 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms even explicitly lists seven acceptable types of 
regulation, namely' 11 : 
106 Jolm .I . Garman "The European Union Combats Racism and Xenophobia by Forbidding 
Expression: An Analysis of the Framework Decision'· (2008) 39 UTOLR 843 , 848 . 
107 John Tillotson, Nigel Foster Text, Cases and 1\/aterials on European Union Law (4ed, 
Routledge Cavendish, London, 2003) 225 . 
108 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 
2-18. 
109 Ibid, art. l 0. 
11 0 Ibid, art. I O (2). 
111 Ibid, art. I O (2). 
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[ l] in the interests of national security, 
[2] territorial integrity or public safety, 
[3] for the preYention of disorder or crime, 
[4] for the protection of health or moral s, 
[ 5] for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, 
[ 6] for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or 
[7] for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
2 European case law 
This section will try to analyse the case law from European courts 
concerning the regulation of fundamental freedoms to provide a prediction 
whether the framework decision will survive legal challenges. Although the 
European Court of Justice has general authority to hear challenges to Article 10 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, most of the cases before that court have been 
concerning economical issues. Therefore, relevant case law is likely to come 
from the (European) Court of Human Rights 112. 
As Article 10 apparently does not "[provide] a coherent vision of freedom 
of expression" 113 , the decisions of the Court of Human Rights on free speech 
issues have been described - and criticized - as "largely inconsistent" 114 , 
especially because the court seems to have acted as a strong defender of the 
right in some cases while refusing to protect the right in other cases 115 In 
Castells v. Spainu6, the European Court of Human Rights found that Spain was 
in violation of Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
11
~ Elizabeth F. Defeis ·'IIuman Rights and the European Union: Who Decides? Possible 
ConOicts between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights" 
[200 l] 19 Dick J Int'l L 30 I, 302-04 . 
113 
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott ''The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Con1parison of tl1e 
American and European Approaches" [ 1999] 7 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 305 , 327. 111 
John J. Garman "The European Union Combats Racism and Xenophobia by Forbidding 
Expression: An Analysis of the Framework Decision" (2008) 39 UTOLR 843 , 850 . 115 Ibid . 
116 Castells v. Spain 14 EIIRR 445 . 
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms when it prosecuted a parliament 
member for insulting the government. The court held that1 11 
freedom of expression is as a genera l rule held to be essential in a 
democrati c society.. [I]t is especially so for an elected representati ve 
whose very role is to act as a spokesman for the opinions and concerns of 
hi s constituents. 
Using a community morality approach, the court provided less protection 
of freedom of expression interests in Otto Preminger Institute v. Austria 118 
where the court permitted the banning of a film under an Austrian law because 
it offended Catholics. Still, the decisions of the court are described as 
"consistent in its application of a hard and steadfast rule when deciding 
challenges based on the protection of Article 10" 11 9 . 
As the right to freely express your opinions "carries with it duties and 
responsibilities" and is therefore limited "to such formalities , conditions and 
restrictions as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society" 120 ; this is the argument around which the Court of Human Rights 
circles to determine whether restrictions on freedom of speech are legal 12 1• 
The European Court of Human Rights applies a test which is split in two 
parts when deciding whether a regulation or a national court' s decision 
infringes with the right of free speech. Doing so, the court tries to examine 
whether the I imitation is necessary to defend "a normally functioning society" 12c. 
As Article 18 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
11 7 Ibid. 
11 8 Otto Preminger !nsti/11/e v. A ustria [ 1994 ] ECIIR 26. 
11 9 John J . Garman "The European Union Combats Racism and Xenophobia by Forbidding 
Express ion: An Analysis of the Framework Decision" (2008) 39 UTOLR 843, 850 
120 European Convention for the Protecti on of Human Right s and Fundamental Freedoms, art . 
I O (2). 
12 1 Susannah Vance "The Pcrmi ibility of Incitement to Religious IIatrcd Offenses under 
European Convention Principles" [ 2004] 14 Transnat'l & Contemp Probs 20 I, 206-09 
122 Ibid, 209 . 
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and Fundamental Freedoms states that "the restrictions permitted under this 
Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose 
other than those for which they have been described" 1:23, only the justifications 
listed in Article 10 (2) and described above124 can be applied by the court 125 . 
Therefore, the first step for a court would be to determine whether the 
limitation meets "the minimal standards of the rule of law" or is "prescribed by 
law" 126. This means that the purpose of the limitation has to be legitimate under 
Article 10 (2) and would furthermore be void if it was too vague 127 . 
Additionally, a limitation or decision of a national court will be struck down if 
it appears to be arbitrary or "a bad faith abuse of power" 128 . 
Best described as a test of proportionality, the court will then take a close 
look whether the limitation is "necessary" to protect a democratic society 129 . 
The consistent interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights on the 
definition of necessary is to determine whether there is a "pressing social need" 
as opposed to being simply useful or desirable130 . This derives from a case 131 
where the conviction of an English publisher who planned to sell obscene 
books in his possession was upheld by the court. When applying this test, the 
court tests whether the limitation is serving a "pressing social need" and is 
furthermore "rationally connected to the objective of the limitation, impairs the 
right as little as possible", while being generally proportional to the purpose of 
123 
European Convention for the Protectio n of Human Ri ghts and Fundamental Freedoms, art 
18. 
124 See above, at IV B 1. 
125 
John J. Garman ''The Euro pean Union Combats Racism and Xenophobia by Forbidding 
Expression: An Analysis of the Framework Decision" (2008) 39 UTOLR 843, 851 . 126 
Susannah Vance "The Permi ssibility of Incitement to Religious I !atred OlTenses under 
European Convention Principles" [20041 14 Transnat'l & Contemp Probs 20 I, 208. 1
~7 Ibid, 208 . 
lcS [bid. 
129 Ibid . 
130 
Handys ide v. Cnited Kingdom [ 1976] 1 ECI !R 737, 754. 131 Hanc(vside v. United Kingdom [ 1976] 1 EC] !R 737 . 
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the objective of the limitation 132 . Generally spoken, a limitation will be struck 
down when the harm caused by the restriction is more severe than the harm 
caused by the speech, thus if one of them being gravely discriminatory in its 
effect on an identifiable groupm 
As described above 13 1, there has been a rise in the number of racial and 
xenophobic motivated incidents in Europe in the last couple of years. Still, the 
European Court of Human Rights seldom had to deal with hate speech. The 
main reason is that under Article 35 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, plaintiffs are required 
to exploit national courts before they can apply to the European Court of 
Human Rights m. This obviously consumes a lot of time, while the court has 
additionally been reluctant to defend free speech in cases concerning racial and 
xenophobic speech, thus demonstrating the importance of other values at 
stake 136 . In cases concerning hate speech aimed at Jews, Nazi or Skinhead 
propaganda, the court has consequently decided in favour of the limitation 
while balancing free speech 137 . 
132 Susannah Vance "The Permissibi lity of Incitement to Religious Hatred Offenses under 
European Convention Principles" [2004] 14 Transnat' I & Contemp Probs 20 I, 209. 
133 John J . Garman "The Euro pean Union Combats Racism and Xenophobia by Forbidding 
Expression: An Anal ys is of the Framework Decision" (2008) 39 UTOLR 843 , 852 . 
134 See above, at IV A. 
135 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fw1damental Freedoms, art. 
35 . 
136 Susannah Vance "The Permissibility of Incitement to Religio us Hatred Offenses w1der 
European Convention Principles'' (2004] 14 Transnat'l & Contcmp Probs 20 1, 229. 
137 Sec discussion in Sionaidh Douglas-Scott ·'The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A 
Compari son of the American and European Approaches" (1 999] 7 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 305, 
329-330, 346 (fo ur decisions by the European Court of Human Rights concerning hate speech). 
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3 Interim result 
Admittedly, there has been some criticism of the framework decision 
which should not be neglected 138 . Additionally, the decision has yet to be 
formally adopted, a move that is expected in the near future. However, given 
the aforementioned decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, even 
when there was no broad consent by Member States on the issue of hate speech, 
the apparent and most probable conclusion is that the court is very likely to 
uphold the then implemented law. This especially when looking at the 
European history with two big wars, one of them most prominently circling on 
racial issues. Most significantly, the European Court of Human Rights has held 
in an appeal by the French denier Roger Garaudy that 139 : 
[tjhere are limits to freedom of expression; the justifi cation of a pro-Nazi 
po li cy cannot enj oy the protection of Article I O and the denial o f clearly 
established hi storica l fac ts - such as the Holocaust - are removed by Article 
17 from the protection of Article I 0. As regards the applicant's convictions 
for denying crimes aga inst humanity , the Court refers to Arti cle 17: in hi s 
book the appli cant ca ll s in question the reality, degree and gravity of 
hi storica l fac ts relating to the Second World War which are clearly 
established, such as the persecution of Jews by the Nazi regime, the 
Ilo locaust and the Nuremberg tri als. Denying crimes aga inst humanity is 
one of the most acute forms of racial defamation towards the Jews and of 
incitement to hatred of them. 
V GERMANY 
Undoubtedly, Germany ' s Holocaust Denial laws are among the strictest 
laws in the world. This section of the paper strives to examine the legislative 
1
~
8 
For an overvie\\ , see John .T. Garman "The European Union Combats Racism and 
Xenophobia by Forbidding Expression : An Analys is of the Framework Decision" (2008) 39 
UTOLR 843 . 
139 
In fo rmation Note No. 54 on the case-law of the Court , European Court of Human Rights, 
Strasbo urg, June 2003 . 
28 
background and how courts have dealt with the right to freedom of expre
ssion 
in cases concerning Holocaust Denial in the past. 
A Legislative Background 
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany grants in Article 5 the
 
freedom of expression. It states i.io: 
( I) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate 
hi s 
opinions in speech, writing, and pictures and to infom1 himself with
out 
hindrance from genera lly accessibl e sources . Freedom of the press a
nd 
freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and fil ms shall be guarante
ed. 
There shall be no censorship. 
(2) These ri ghts shall find their limits in the provisions of genera l laws,
 in 
provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to perso
nal 
honour. 
Even taking only a very brief look at these two sections it becomes
 
obvious that the German Basic Law does not grant an unlimited right to 
freely 
express ones opinion. There is ongoing discussion about the provisi
on of 
"general laws", as this is a very broad term that needs constant interpretat
ion as 
to when a law is "general". 
There are three dimensions to the rights granted by Art. 5 of the Basic
 
Law: an internal dimension (the development of opinion and artis
tic or 
scholarly ideas), a communicative aspect (the expression of opinion
 and 
creation of works of art or science), and an external dimension (the eff
ect of 
opinions, art, or science on the addressee or the audience)
14 1
. 
140 Basic Law ol' the Federal Republic of Gemrnny, text Edition - talus December 2
000 
(o ffi cial translation) . 
141 See BVerfGE 30, 173 , I 89, Decision of 24 February 197 l , (Mephisto). 
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Additionally to that, the German Criminal Code 14c provides a provision 
making it a criminal offence to publicly deny, approve or render harmless any 
of the crimes committed under the national socialistic regime. According to 
these provisions in the Criminal Code, not only Holocaust Denial but also other 
hate-related speeches are criminalised 143 . It is very noteworthy that under the 
German Criminal Code the pure Denial of the Holocaust is criminalized 
without the requirement of an intention to harm others 144 
B German Courts 
German courts have in the past left little doubt that the denial of the 
Holocaust falls under section 130 of the German Criminal Code and that this 
section furthermore is consistent with the German Constitution. As there are 
numerous criminal cases, this section will be limited to the most significant and 
most controversial discussed cases . 
J Criminal courts 
(a) Federal Republic of Germany v Deckert 145 I and II 
Mr Deckert was convicted under section 130 of the Criminal Code for his 
denial of the Holocaust. The Supreme Court stated that the Holocaust was such 
an historic incontrovertible fact that there was no need of a hearing of facts on 
this matter. Furthermore it stated that the denial was an obvious attack on 
human dignity and that there was no reason to mitigate his sentence - as the 
142 
Criminal Code of the Federa l Republi c of Gcnnany, s 130 (see Appendi x) . 
143 
Win fricd Brugger ''The Trea tment of Ira te Speech in German Constitutional Law (Part I)" 
(2002) 3 GLJ 0 1, 17. 
114 
Criminal Code of the Federa l Republi c of Germany, s 130 (3). This point will be discussed 
at a later stage of that paper, as it is a signi ficant di stincti on from the suggestion by the 
European Union as well as the Canadi an and New Zea land approach towards hate speech. 
11s G 
er111 any v Deckert I ( 15 March 1994) BGH (Federal Supreme Court) I StR 179/93 and 
Germany v Deckert II ( 15 December 1994) BG I-1 I StR 656/94. 
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High Court previously had considered
116 
- because of the defendant's firm belief 
in the correctness of his allegation. The reasoning of the High Court had led to 
a storm of protest in Germany' s legal landscape
147 and consequently to the 
overruling of the judgment. It was stated that "one does not deserve mitigation 
who willingly defies the historical fact of the Holocaust"
118
. 
(b) Federal Republic of Germany v Toeben
149 
Mr Toeben was a German-born Australian citizen who is the director of 
the " Adelaide Institute". From 1992 on he dealt with the Holocaust and 
submitted - from Australia - articles on the Internet in which he argued 
revisionist theses and denied the Holocaust. He argued the Holocaust to be a 
fiction of Jews to defame Germans politically and to enforce financial claims. It 
is noteworthy that Toeben ' s articles were written in German, this clearly aimed 
at a German audience. The Federal Supreme Court did not see a need to 
substantially deal with the question whether the publications of the defendant 
where criminal offences under section 130 of the Criminal Code. In the view of 
the Supreme Court this was a given. However the Court had to deal with the 
question whether Toeben could be convicted under German law, as he was 
neither a German citizen nor did he upload his publications in German territory. 
The court came to the conclusion that German law was applicable as the 
defendant wanted his publications to be read in Germany and therefore the 
place of success for his actions was Germany. This judgement evoked criticism 
especially because Holocaust Denial was not a criminal offence under 
Australian law. The main criticism was that this judgment created the 
116 Germany v Deckert, High Court of Mannheim, (22 June 1994) (6) 5 KLs 2/92 . 
117 Bertram "Annotation to the 'Deckert-case ''' ( 1994) NJW 2494 . 
118 Germany v Deckert ff ( 15 December 1994) BGH l StR 656/94. 
149 Germany v Toeben (1 2 December 2000) BGII I StR 184/00, sec also "Federal Court of 
Justice (BGI I) Convicts Foreigner fo r Internet Posted Incitement to Racial Hatred" (200 l) 2 
GL.Tno 8. 
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1mpress1on that the Supreme Court aimed at making Germany ' s moral 
measures applicable worldwide. 
2 NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany) v Federal Republic of 
Germany150 (Constitutional Court of Germany) 
In this case the German Constitutional Court had to decide on a complaint 
by the NPD. The party had invited "historian" David Irving, a well-known and 
previously convicted revisionist to a public lecture. The competent authority 
imposed a condition on the party to ensure that no revisionist theses would be 
publicly proclaimed at this lecture. The party appealed against this order stating 
that it would violate the right of freedom of expression. The Court observed 
that1 5 1: 
[ opinions] are marked by the individual's subjec ti ve rel ati onshi p to hi s 
statement ' s content. Opin ions are characteri zed by an element of taking a 
posi tion and o f appraising. To thi s extent , demonstra tion of their truth or 
untruU1 is impossible. They enjoy the bas ic ri ght ' s pro tecti on regardless of 
whether ili cir expression is judged to be well-fo unded or un fo unded, 
emotional or ra tional, va luable o r worililess, dangerous or harml ess. The 
basic right's protection also extends to the sta tement ' s fo rm. An expression 
of opinion does not lose thi s protecti on by be ing sharply or hurtfully 
worded. 
However the court upheld the order, stating that: 
The object of the basic right pro tection of Art 5 ( I ) sentence I Basic Law is 
opinions. It is to them that the freedom to make statements and di sseminate 
them refers. Opinions are characterized by the subj ecti ve relati onshi p of the 
individual to the content of hi s statement.( .. 
1
'
0 
NPD v Germany ("1 11schwitz lie) ( 13 April 1994) BVerfGE 90, 241 (translation at 
http ://, v,,, v. utexas . edu/1 a w /academics/ cen ters/transnati onal) . 
1
'
1 Ibid, 241 , 247 . 
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From thi s point of view, incorrect infonnation is not an interest worthy of 
protection. The Federal Constitutional Court has thus consistently held that 
an assertion of fact known or proved to be untrue is not covered by the 
protection of freedom of opinion. [ .. . ] 
The prohibited statement that there was no persecution of Jews in the Third 
Reich is an assertion of fact which is proved to be untrue according to 
innumerable eye witness reports and documents, the verdicts of courts in 
numerous criminal proceedings, and the findings of hi story. Taken by itself, 
an assertion of thi s content does not, therefore, enjoy the protection of 
freedom of opinion. 
Not surprisingly this assumption was criticised heavily by numerous 
German scholars 152 . However even those academics come to the conclusion -
but for a different reason - that the denial of the Holocaust should not be 
protected by the freedom of expression. In their view the freedom of expression 
is always competing with other fundamental rights such as human dignity - in 
this case the dignity of the victims of the Holocaust. Therefore the limitation of 
the freedom of expression is seen to be consistent with the German 
Constitution 153 . 
VI CANADA AS THE WORLD'S CENTRE OF HOLOCAUST 
LITIGATION 
Unlike numerous European countries and Israel , no common law 
countries have explicit Holocaust Denial laws so far. Nevertheless, despite 
lacking explicit Holocaust Denial legislation, common law jurisprudence had to 
deal with Holocaust Denial and especially Canada has emerged as the common 
law' s centre of holocaust litigation
154 
is: Winfried Brugger ''The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional La\\ (Part II)" 
(2003) 4 GLJ I, 33. 
153 Jngo von Muench / Philip Kunig (ed) Co111111enta1y to the Germ an Basic Law (5 ed, Beck, 
Munich, 2000) 388. 
154 Gera ld Tishler, Alan Dcrshowitz, Arthur Berney et al "Debate : Freedom of Speech and 
I Iolocaust Denial" ( 1987) 5 Card L R 559, 560 . 
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A R v. Zundel 
For some time, Ernst Zundel , a German-born commercial publisher in 
Toronto, had not only been the chief disseminator of Holocaust Denial and hate 
propaganda in Canada, but also had been the chief exporter internationally of 
this material to centres in Europe and elsewhere. After she had suffered from a 
continuous stream of this material, one Holocaust survivor, Sabina Citron, 
wanted to place a sanction or complaint under the criminal code. At that time, 
Canada had a criminal provision which rendered illegal the dissemination of 
hate propaganda or that kind of communication other than private conversation 
which promotes hatred or contempt of an identifiable group" 5. She attempted to 
have Mr Zundel prosecuted under the hate propaganda provisions of the 
criminal code. However, under the section, the consent of the attorney general 
was required for purposes of prosecution 156 . Although the Attorney General was 
sympathetic with the concerns and the anguish of Holocaust survivors, he was 
nevertheless not willing to give his approval because he feared that the section 
of the criminal code was unenforceable and that a prosecution would fail. 
Unimpressed, Citron found another section of the Canadian criminal code, 
which was only invoked once before in the history of Canada. That provision 
made it an offence for someone to wilfully spread false news causing or likely 
to cause racial or religious intolerance 157 . Therefore, Zundel was prosecuted 
under that provision 118 . However, his appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court on 
155
Canada's IIate Propaganda Act, R.C.S. eh . C-34, § 281 . 1-.3 ( 1st Supp. 1970) provided in 
relevant part : 
(I) Every one who, by communicating statement s in any public place, incites hatred aga inst any 
identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is li able to impri somnent for two years ... . 
(2) Every one who, by communicating statements , other than in private conversa tion, wilfully 
promotes hatred agai nst any identifi able group is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is li able to impri somnent for \\VO years , .. , 
156 Id . § 28 1.1 (3). 
157 
Id . § 177 (1970) . Thi s statute pro,·ided: "Every one "ho wilfully publi shes a statement , 
tal e or news that he knows is fal se and that causes or is likely to cause injury or mi schief to a 
public interest is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to impri sonment fort wo years" 158 R v Zundel l 1992] 2 SCR 73 l . . 
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free speech grounds was successful 159. The Court distinguished from Keegstra 1
60 
reasoning that the "false news" offence was much wider16 1: 
I do not assert that Parli ament cannot criminalize the di ssemination of 
racial slurs and hate propaganda. I do assert , however, that such provisions 
must be drafted with suffi cient particul arity to offer assurance that they 
cannot be abused so as to stifle a broad range o f legitimate and va luable 
speech 
The decision by the Supreme Court was however harshly criticised. An 
argument was made that the decision was not only 'the most shameful decision 
under the charter", but that the reasoning by the majority - which was delivered 
by McLachlin J - deserved "the Kafka prize for legal reasoning". Additionally, 
the decision would " read like, and form part of, Holocaust Denial literature 
itself' 162 . This is however not the strongest language in which the decision has 
been described. Especially the suggestion by McLachlin J that the denial of the 
Holocaust might be capable of serving the public has been described as 
"disgusting" 163 . 
B R v Keegstra 
The leading common law case about hate speech and Holocaust Denial is 
the (Canadian) Supreme Court decision in R v Keegstra 16.J. James Keegstra was 
a high school social studies teacher as well as the mayor of Eckville Alberta. 
Keegstra taught his students for years that Jews were "child killers" out to 
destroy Christianity and that Jews created the myth of Holocaust to gain 
159 Ibid . 
160 R v Keegstra [ 1990 J 3 SCR 697. 
16 1 R v Zundel [ 1992] 2 SCR 73 1, 743. 
162 Michael Mandel The Charter of Rights and the legalization of Politics in Canada 
(Thompson Educati onal Publishing, Toro nto, 1994) 369. 
163 Joel Bakan Just Words: Comtit11tional Rights and Social /l'rongs (Uni versity o f Toronto 
Press , Toronto, 1997), 96. 
16
~ R v Keegstra [ 1990] 3 SCR 697. 
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sympathy. He further taught them that the Holocaust never had happened. For 
these reasons he was prosecuted with wilfully promoting hatred under then 
Section 281(2) [which is now Section 319(2) of Canada's Criminal Code] which 
criminalizes the wilful public communication of extreme hatred against an 
identifiable group 165 . Decisively, the communication is deemed "wilful," 
therefore according a high standard of intention in terms of a criminal mens rea 
where an accused subjectively wants the promotion of hatred or foresees such a 
consequence as certain or considerably certain to result from their act 166 . 
Keegstra was convicted on the basis of his anti-Semitic and denial teachings, 
among them the claim that the Holocaust "was manufactured by the Jews to 
gain sympathy" 167 . Unsurprisingly, Keegstra appealed his conviction, claiming 
that the crucial provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code violated his rights 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; especially, but not 
exclusively, his right to free speech 168 . Although the Supreme Court 
165 Section 3 19 of the Canadian Criminal Code states: 
(2) Every one who , by communicating statements, 0U1er Urnn in private conversation, wilfully 
promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to impri sonment for a term not exceeding two years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction . 
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2) 
(a) if he establishes iliat the statements communicated were true; 
(b) if, in good faith , he expressed or attempted to establish by argument an op1111on on a religious subject ; 
(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest , ilie di scussion of which was 
for the public benefit , and if on reasonable grounds he believed them to be true ; or 
(d) if, in good faith , he intended to point out , for the purpose of removal , matters producing or 
tending to produce feelings of hatred towards an identifiable group in Canada . 
(6) No proceeding for an offence under subsection (2) shall be instituted without the consent of 
the Attorney General. 
(7) In thi s section ,' communicating' includes communicating by telephone, broadcasting or other audible or visible means; 
"identifiable group" has the same meaning as in section 318; 
'public place' includes any place to which the public have access as of right or by invitation, expres or implied; 
"statements" includes words spoken or written or recorded electronically or electro-
magnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other visible representations. 166 
Karen Elli s "A Constitutional ' Right' to Deny and Promote Genocide? Preempling the 
Usurpation of Human Rights Discourse to\\ards Incitement from a Canadian Perspective" (2008) 9 CDZJCR 463 , 473 . 
167 R v Keegstra [ 1990] 3 SCR 697, 714. 
168 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, enacted 
as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, eh. 11 ( U.K .) states: 
36 
acknowledged that the Charter was in fact infringed, because even hate speech 
was a protected form of expression, they still upheld the conviction. The 
Supreme Court found that the limitation on the free speech right was justified in 
terms of Section 1 of the Charter because of minority rights to protection 
against group-vilifying speech 169. The justices held that 110 : 
Where [the Charter's balancing lest] operates to accenluale a uniquely 
Canadian view of a free and democratic society [ ... ] we must not hesitate to 
depart from the path taken in the United States [ .. . ) the special role to be 
given equality and multi cultura li sm in the Canadi an Constitution 
necessitates a departure from the view, reasonably preva lent in America at 
the present, that the suppression of hate propaganda is incompatible with 
the guarantee of free expression 
It is however noteworthy that the Supreme Court was not unanimous on 
this decision, and that the conviction was only upheld by a single vote. 
Only four years later, Keegstra was convicted again
11 1 for the incitement 
of hatred. The appeal to the Supreme Court was solely based on the issue 
whether Section 319 (3) (a) 172 places a reverse onus on the accused and would 
therefore violate Section 11 ( d) of the Canadian Charter, which contains the 
right to a fair trial 173 . As that was also an issue in the first decision against 
I . The Canadi an Charter of Right s and Freedoms guarantees the right s and freedoms set out in 
it subj ect only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably Justifi ed in a 
free and democra ti c society. 
2. Everyone has the foll owing fundamental freedoms .. 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other 
media of communication 
169 R v Keegstra [ J 990] 3 SCR 697, 743. 
170 Ibid . 
17 1 R v Keegstra [ I 996 1 I SCR 458 
172 Secti on 31 9 (3) (a) reads; 
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsecti on (2) 
(a) if he establi shes that the statements communicated ,, ere true; 
173 The Canadian Charter of Ri ghts and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, enacted 
as Schedule B to the Canada Act I 982 , eh. 11 (U.K .) sta tes: 
1 I . AJ1y person charged with an offence has the ri ght 
d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law m a fa ir and public 
hearing by an independent and imparti al tribunal 
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Keegstra, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction in a very brief judgement, 
stating that "the decision of this court in R v Keegstra is a complete answer"rn. 
VII HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION-A GENERAL 
OVERVIEW 
The question whether hate speech should be regulated is one 
controversially discussed among legal researcher in nearly all jurisdictions. 
This section therefore aims to discuss the various reasons for and against 
regulating hate speech in general 175 . 
A The Harm Rationale 
The potential harm caused by hate speech can generally be categorized 
into two groups: First, the harm that may be caused to the individual target, or 
the targeted group. Secondly, the harm that society as a whole may suffer from 
the hateful messages. 
Hate speech is often described as undermining fundamental democratic 
values and creating an atmosphere of discrimination and potential violence176 . 
For those reasons alone society would suffer. However, society also suffers 
because of the danger that the promotion of hate speech can lead to a lessened 
perception of the targets , thus their involvement in society being held in low 
esteem and therefore resulting in discrimination as well as unequal chances m_ 
Furthermore, hate speech is regarded as an increase in the risk of hate crimes, 
171 
R v Keegs tra [ 1996 J I SCR 458, 459. 
171 
As outli ned above, II, the author is of the opinion Lhat the denial of the holoca ust is regularly connected with hate, and can therefore be considered to be hate speech. 176 
Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: Competing Ri ght s to Freedom of Expression" (1996) 8 Auckland ULR 185 , 195 . 
177 
A Regel "Hate Propaganda: /\. Reason to Limit Freedom of Expression" ( 1984) 49 Sask Law Rev 303 , 308 . 
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xenophobia and genocide 178 . This perception 1s recently supported by the 
Framework decision of the European Union 179 . Additionally, hate speech raises 
the risk of tensions not only between speakers and targets, but also between the 
speakers and those who disagree and between targets and non-targets 180 . It has 
even been argued that hate speech may cause the targets to react with violence 
towards the speakers or towards society which allows for the hate speech 18 1. 
This perception might appear to be a little bit of a stretch at first, but isn ' t 
completely unrealistic given the recent world-wide experiences with the 
"Mohammed-cartoons" and the subsequent riots 182 . 
The harm hate speech causes on the individual or the target group is owed 
to the fact that the speech is meant to degrade or denigrate them. It also 
advances the idea that the targets are inferior183 . One commentator has argued 
that this generates an atmosphere where further hate or even violence towards 
the targets might appear acceptable184. It has been noted by other commentators 
that demeaning consequences of hate speech are capable of leading to lesser 
possibilities of the targets in work, school or other public areas 185 and that is has 
caused underachievement by targets in academic circumstances 186 . These are 
however indirect causes of the hate speech. 
178 Jean Francois and Ga udreault DcsBiens "From Sisyphus ' s Dilemma to Sisyphus ' s Duty? A 
Mediati on on the Regu lation of Hate Propaganda in Relation to Hate Crimes and Genocide" 46 
McGill LJ 111 7, 111 9. 
179 See above, IV 
180 Richard Delgado ''Words that Wound A Tort Ac ti on for Racial Insult s, Epithets and Name-
Calling" (1 982) 17 1-Iarv CR-CLL R 133 , 134. 
18 1 Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech m1d its Limits (Kluwer Academic Publi shers, The 
Netherl ands, I 999) , I 95 . 
182 I am not suggesting that these cartoons contained hate speech; nevertheless the point made 
remains the same. 
183 Kent Greenawa lt Fighting Il'ords: /11di vid11a/s, Co 1111111111ities, and Liberties of Speech 
(Princeton Uni versity Press, New Jersey, 1995) , 59. 
184 Ka thleen Mahoney ''Ilate Speech: Affirmation or Contradi ction of Freedom of Expression" 
( 1996) U ILL L R 789, 792 . 
185 Catherine Lane West-Newman "Reading IIate Speech from the Bottom in Aoteaora : 
Subjec ti vity, Empathy and Cultura l Diffe rence" 9 Waikato LR 23 1, 232 . 
186 J Aronsen, OM Quinn and S .I Spencer " Stereotype Threa t and the Academic 
Underpcrfo rmance of Minorities and Women" in J K Swim and C Stangor (eds) Prejudice: The 
Target 's Perspective (Academic Press, San Diego, 1998) . 
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Among the more direct results of hate speech on the targets that have been 
reported is the reflection of targets on their social status, their immediate fear 
for safety and also - as remarked above - their potential engagement in violent 
riots 187 . In terms of Holocaust Denial, victims could fear that history might get 
forgotten and therefore fear an increased risk of repetition. Others have argued 
that hate speech may cause an immediate reaction of psychological and 
physical harm - like high blood pressure, insomnia or hypertension - on the 
targets 188, as the speech is regularly insulting and therefore results in emotional 
suffering 189 . In the words of the Canadian Supreme Court 190 : 
It is indisputable that the emotional damage caused by words may be of 
grave psychological and social consequence. In the context of sexual 
harassment , for example, this Court has found that words can in themselves 
constitute harassment (Janzen v. Platy Ente1prises Ltd. [ 1989] I S.C.R. 
1252). In a similar manner, words and writings that wilfully promote hatred 
can constitute a serious attack on persons belonging to a racial or religious 
group, and in thi s regard the Cohen Committee noted that these persons are 
humiliated and degraded. 
In Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group191 it was held 
by Thomas J that videos degrading homosexuals were capable of 
"psychologically scaring" and to "victimise and alienate a sizeable proportion 
of the population" 19=' . 
187 
Laura Beth Nielsen " Subtle, Pervasive, Harmful : Raci st and sex ist Remarks in Public as IIate Speech" (2002) 58 Journal of Social Issues 265, 278. 188 
Gregory Herek "Victim Experiences In Hate Crimes Based on Sexual Orientation" (2002) 58 Journal of Social Issues 3 I 9. 
189 Larry Alexander ''Banning Hate Speech and the Stick and Stone Defense" (l 996) 13 Const Comm 71 , 73. 
190 
R v Keegstra [ 1990] 3 SCR 697, 746 (Dickson CJ) 191 
Living fl'ord Distributors v H11111an Rights 1-lction Group (2000] 3 NZLR 570. 192 Ibid, 588. 
40 
B Tlte Importance of Freedom of Expression 
The value of freedom of expression has been stated in courts numerous 
times. In the Ontario Court of Appeal it was stated by Cory J that "a democracy 
cannot exist without the freedom to express new ideas and to put forward 
opinions about the functioning of public institutions" 193. It is said to be the most 
important democratic right, and that all other rights directly depend on the 
freedom of expression 194 . However, this is only part of the truth. First of all, 
equality is a right that is by many considered to be of the same value to 
democracy, and that hate speech is "inherently limiting of the concept of 
equality" 195 . 
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that rights are not absolute196 , and it has 
been stated in numerous cases that "individual freedoms are necessarily limited 
by membership of society and by the rights of others and the interests of the 
community" 197 . For example, freedom of expression is widely accepted to be 
limited by the laws of "defamation, blasphemy, confidentiality, confidential 
obligations associated with employment, copyright, contempt, incitement, 
official secrecy, sedition and noise pollution" 198 . One who wants to use his or 
her freedom of expression is therefore obliged to not infringe with the rights 
and freedoms of others 199 . 
193 R v Kopyto ( 1987) 4 7 DLR ( 4 th) 213 , 226. 
194 Juliet Moses "Ilate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" ( 1996) 8 
Auckland ULR 185, I 90. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler and Andrew Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: .-1 
Co111111enta,y (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) , 11 9. 
197 R vB [1995] 2 NZLR 172, 182. 
196 Mandy Tibbey ''Developments in Anti-Vilification Law· (2001) 21 Aust Bar Rev 1, 4,5. 
199 Proceedings Co111111isioner v .'"1 rcher [ I 996] 3 NRNZ 123 , 129, I 30. 
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C Reasons for Protecting Freedom of Expression 
The regulation of hate speech and limitation of freedom of expression is 
opposed by people who believe that the possible harm caused by that speech is 
outweighed by the importance of freedom of expression 200 . The various 
approaches and reasoning for their views are discussed below. 
1 Marketplace of ;deas 
Maybe the most famous modern theory addressing the importance of 
freedom of expression is the "marketplace of ideas" deriving from the writings 
of John Stuart Mill2°1 and advocated by Holmes J in his famous and often-cited 
dissenting opinion in Abrams v Un;ted S1ates202 . Holmes argued that all truth or 
knowledge is derived from a free trade of ideas and that the legitimacy of these 
ideas is to be determined through competition. Furthermore, even false or 
harmful v iews are to be available to the public for evaluation to strengthen this 
system of trade and the system can not function in an effective way if some 
ideas are removed. Under that rationale freedom of expression is a necessity for 
the development of truth203 . In his own words204 : 
But when men have realised that that time has upset many fighting fa iths, 
the may come to believe even more than they beli eve the very foundations 
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by a 
free trade in ideas - th at the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get it self accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
20° Catherine Lane West-Ne,, man "Reading Hate Speech fro m the Bottom in Aoteaora : 
Subjectivity, Empathy and Cultura l Difference'' 9 Waikato LR 23 1, 236. 
20 1 See John Stuart Mill On Liberty (Penguin Books, London, 1968) . 
202 , lbra111s v United States ( 19 19) 250 US 6 16. 
203 Grant H uscroft "Defamation, Racial Disharmony and Freedom of Expression" in Grant 
Huscro ft and Paul Ri shworth (eds) Rights and Freddo111s: The Ne w Zealand Bill of Rights ,-let 
I 990 and the /fu111an Rig hts Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995), 193. 
20 1 Abrams v United States ( 1919) 250 US 6 16, 630 (IIomes J di ssenting) (emphasis added by 
author). 
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only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any 
rate is the theory of our constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an 
experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our sa lvation 
upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that 
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant 
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and 
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten 
immediate inte,jerence with the lawfiil and pressing purposes of the law 
that an immediate check is required to save the country. 
The theory of a marketplace of ideas especially had an enormous 
influence in the American jurisprudence, as it was also a primary focus in New 
York Times v Sullivan205 as well as in Reno v American Civil Liberties Union
206
• 
2 The rationales of tolerance and self fulfilment 
Another idea as to why not limit freedom of expression is the thought that 
we have to tolerate all opinions, no matter how disgusting and offensive they 
might be to us, and that this would avert governments and states to control 
expressions, beliefs and ideas
207
. 
Furthermore, a different approach 1s the justification for freedom of 
expression as a value of its own
208
. This idea is based on the conception that 
"the development of human personality and achievement of self-realisation are 
dependent on opportunities to form and communicate beliefs and thoughts to 
others" 209_ Accordingly, it was held in the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
that the intention of the right to free speech was not only the advancement of 
~
05 New fork Times vSul/ivan !1 9641 376 US 254 . 
206 Reno v .•lmerican Civil Liberties L'nion [ 1997] 521 US 844. 
207 Lee Bollinger The Tolerant Society (Oxford Universi ty Press , Oxford, I 988) . 
208 Ingo von Muench and Paul Ktmig (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar (5cd, Beck, Mw1ich, 2000), 
art 5 parn I. 
209 Juliet Moses " [fate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression'' ( 1996) 8 
Auckland ULR 185, 19 1. 
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truth, but also to permit people to arrive at their fullest potentia12 IO_ Similarly, it 
was held in the Canadian Supreme Court that one of the underlying principles 
of free speech was the self fulfilment of the individual, which resulted in the 
reasoning that "all content regardless of its popularity, aesthetic or moral 
tastefulness" should be protectedc11 . 
3 Freedom of expression as the "engine-room of a democratic state, . 
The third and probably most political argument for the protection of free 
speech is the idea that it is an essential requirement to make the democratic 
process work; and that freedom of speech is therefore inherently linked to 
democracy212_ It was therefore held by Rand J that "parliamentary government 
is ultimately government by the public opinion of an open society" and that this 
required "the condition of a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of 
ideas" 213_ Comparably, it was held by Brennan J in New York Times v Sulhvan 
that214 : 
The maintenance of the opporttmity for free politi ca l di scuss ion to the end 
that government may be responsive to the will o f the people and that 
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the 
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional 
system. 
The High Court of Australia took a similar approach. They found that 
although freedom of expression was not explicitly protected by law, the right 
could nevertheless be derived from Australia' s commitment towards being a 
democracy21 5 . 
cio Curtis v A fini s /er of Saf ety and Security [ 1996] 5 BCLR 609 (SACC). 
~11 R vSharpe [200 1] I94DLR (4 th) 1 (SCC), para 14 1. 
211 Switz111an v Elbing [ 1957] SCR 285 , 306. 
213 Switz111an v Elbing f 19571 SCR 285 , 306 (Rand J). 
:
14 New York Tim es v Sullivan l I 964] 376 US 254, 269 (Brennan J, citing Stromberg v 
California [1 93 1] 283 US 359, 369) 
215 Nation wide News Pty Ltd v /l'i//s [ 1992] 177 CLR 1 (H CA). 
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It is however noteworthy that Brennan J based his reasoning not solely on 
the conception of democracy. Rather, he linked it with the theory of the 
marketplace of ideas2 16 and held thaf 17 : 
[A] profound national commitment to the principle that debate on publi c 
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well 
include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials. 
D Criticism of these Approaches Concerning Hate Speech 
No matter how well-reasoned those approaches to freedom of expression 
are there are not surprisingly other theories that support limitation on this right, 
especially when it comes to hate speech. It has been stated numerous times that 
rights are not absolute, that " individual freedoms are necessarily limited by 
membership of society and by the rights of others and the interests of 
community" 21 8 . Nothing less has to be applied to hate speech. 
The marketplace of ideas theory claims that free speech furthers society' s 
knowledge and the advancement of truth. However, it fails to recognize that 
hate speech furthers discrimination, hate and intolerance. It is a tool to spread 
falsehoods to the gain of the hate-monger and to the harm of the target. 
Allowing complete freedom of expression mirrors the belief that the public will 
be able to distinguish between falsehood and truth
2 19
. Sadly however, while in 
the long run that belief may be true, history shows that especially in the short 
2 16 See above, VII B 2 (a) . 
2 17 New fork Times vSulli van [1 964] 376 US 254, 270. 
2 18 R v B [ 1995] 2 NZLR 172, 182. See also Andrew Butler and Petra Butler and Andrew Butler 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights . ..Jct: .-1 Co111111enta,y (Lex isNexis, Well ington, 2005) , 1 19. 
2 19 Juliet Moses ''Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Ex pression'' (1996) 8 
Auckland ULR 185 , 193 . 
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term there is grave danger that falsehood will prevail 
220
. As the Cohen 
Committee found22 1: 
We are less confident in the 20th century that the critical faculties of 
individuals will be brought to bear on the speech and writing which is 
directed al them . In the 18th and 19th centuries , there was a widespread 
belief that man was a rational creature, and that if his mind was trained and 
liberated from superstition by education, he would always distinguish truth 
from falsehood , good from evil. So Milton, who said "let truth and 
falsehood grapple: who ever knew truth put to the worse in a free and open 
encow1ter" . We cannot share this faith today in such a simple form . While 
holding that over the long rw1, the human mind is repelled by blatant 
falsehood and seeks the good, it is loo often true, in the short run , that 
emotion displaces reason and individuals perversely reject the 
demonstrations of truth put before them and forsake the good they know. 
The successes of modem advertising, the triwnphs of impudent propaganda 
such as Hitler's, have qualified sharply our belief in the rationality of man. 
We know that under strain and pressure in times of irritation and frustration, 
the individual is swayed and even swept away by hysterical , emotional 
appeals . We act irresponsibly if we ignore the way in which emotion can 
drive reason from the field. 
Neither the tolerance theory nor the self-fulfilment theory are plausible. 
The preaching of tolerance fails to recognize the harm caused in targets of hate 
speech. It has also been argued that tolerating hate speech would impose a too 
heavy burden on targets22'.!_ The "paradox of tolerance" is, as stated by Popper, 
that it leads to intolerance and that tolerance of hate speech results in even more 
hate speech and even more harm223 . The communication of hate speech does not 
220 L Summer '' Should Hate Speech be Free Speech? Jolu1 Stuart Mill and The Limits of 
Tolerance'' in Raphael Cohen-Almagor (ed) liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance: 
Essays in Honor and Memo1y of Yitzhak Rabin (Michigan University Press, Aim Arbor, 2000) , 
133 . 
22 1 Cited ,,ith approval in R v Keegstra [ 1990] 3 SCR 697, 747. 
m Juliet Moses "Ilate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" ( l 996) 8 
Auckland ULR 185, 193 . 
223 Karl Popper The Open Society and Its Enemies (Routledge and Kegan, London, l 962) , vols 
I , 2. 
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lead to self-fulfilment; it rather leads to a closed mind and prejudice. It is 
furthermore self-limiting, as the speaker lives in a "world of ignorance" and it 
refutes the rights of others to flourishc24 . 
While freedom of expression may very well be the "engine-room" for 
democracy, the same cannot be said about hate speech. Instead of furthering 
and encouraging democracy, hate speech weakens democracy by discouraging 
others from participation225 . Furthermore, hate speech leads to the disrespect of 
the opinions of the targeted, which can subsequently lead to a limitation of their 
possibility to be represented in the democratic process226 . 
Supporters of the above mentioned theories contend that freedom of 
expression is such a fundamental right that it should only be limited in cases of 
immediate danger to society. According to this "public-order test" a direct 
causation of harm by the speech is required, and the possible harm in the future 
is no legitimate reason to limit freedom of expression227 . However, this theory 
does not acknowledge the psychological harm that can be caused or the harm 
that can be caused on the relationship between the targets and the general 
public. 
Hate speech legislation is also rejected with the argument that this leads to 
a "slippery slope" towards censorship. But there is also another "slippery slope 
to be recognized: one that leads into a marketplace of ideas where bad ideas 
prosper and good ideas vanish228 . A good example is the idea that is supported 
224 Richard Delgado ''Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racia l Insults, Epithets and Name-
Cal\ing" ( 1982) 17 Harv CR-CLL R 133 , 176. 
225 Juliet Moses "IIate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" (l 996) 8 
Auckland ULR I 85 , 193. 
226 A.Ian Regel "Ilate Propaganda: A Reason to Limit Freedom of Expression" ( l 984) 49 Sask 
Law Rev 303 , 308 . 
227 Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and its limits (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The 
Netherl ands, 1999) 180. 
228 Irwin Cotler "IIolocaust Denial, Equali ty and Ilann : Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance in 
a Liberal Democracy" in Raphael Cohcn-Almagor (cd) liberal Democracy and the Limits of 
To lerance: fasays in Honor ancl Afem01y of fitzhak Rabin (Michigan Univer ity Pres , Ann 
Arbor, 2000) , 15 1, 169. 
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by some observers that the best method to combat hate speech would be to use 
counter speech::'::'9 . However, that can cause other problems. Fighting back can 
cause even more hate speech and end in an unwanted spiral of hate::' 30 . And, 
especially in the case of Holocaust Denial , the argument has been made that 
countering the allegations could be undesirable for the reason not to give the 
deniers more attention than they deserve231 . 
Kathleen Mahoney expressed the argument that "hate propaganda is not 
legitimate speech. It is a form of harassment and discrimination that should be 
deterred and punished just like any other behaviour that harms people" 232 . I 
agree with that view, especially as hate speech brings little social value and 
grave harm. Nevertheless, it is indispensable that the regulation of hate speech 
must be balanced with the right to freedom of expression. 
VIII NEW ZEALAND AND ITS HATE SPEECH PROVISIONS 
New Zealand, like other common law countries, does not have explicit 
Holocaust Denial legislation. However, the Human Rights Act 1993 contains 
two provisions prohibiting hate speech233 . Therefore, the purpose of this chapter 
will be to examine whether the denial of the Holocaust is capable of falling 
under the criminal hate speech provision. 
Hate speech is commonly defined as a message that intends to denigrate 
or a degrade a group of people for reasons of their race, ethnic or national origin, 
m Ursula Cheer "Submission to the Select Committee Inquiry into the Operation of the Films, 
Videos and Publicati ons Classification Act 1993 and Related Issues'', 8 
230 Ri chard Delgado " Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Rac ial Insults, Epithets and Name-
Calling" (1982) 17 IIarv CR-CLL R 133 , 140. 
231 See above I. 
232 Kathl een Mahoney "Ha te Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Freedom of Expression" 
( 1996) U ILL L R 789, 792 . 
m Human Rights Act 1993, ss 6 1, 13 1. 
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religious belief, sex or sexual orientation, colour or their disability234 However, 
the criminal provision under the Human Rights Act 1993 is much narrower and 
more explicit. It reads235 : 
(1) Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction 
to imprisorunent for a term not exceeding 3 months or to a fine not 
exceeding $7,000 who, with intent to excite hostility or illwill against, or 
bring into contempt or ridicule , any group of persons in New Zealand on 
the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of 
persons, 
(a) Publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, abusive, or 
insulting, or broadcasts by means of radio or television words which are 
threatening, abusive, or insulting; 
or 
(b) Uses in any public place (as defined in section 2(1) of the Summary 
Offences Act I 98 I), or within the hearing of persons in any such public 
place, or at any meeting to which the public are invited or have access , 
words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting, 
being matter or words likely to excite hostility or illwill against , or bring 
into contempt or ridicule, any such group of persons in New Zealand on the 
ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of 
persons. 
The origin for this section is Section 25 of the Race Relations Act 1971 
(repealed), which was enacted as part of the requirement to comply with New 
Zealand's obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERDf36 . No prosecution can occur 
234 Jean Francois and Gaudreau]! DesBiens "From Sisyphus's Dilemma to Sisyphus ' s Duty? A 
Mediation on the Regulation of Hate Propaganda in Relation to IIate Crimes and Genocide'' 46 
McGill LJ 1117, 1118. 
235 Human Rights Act 1993, s 131 . 
236 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (4 
January 1969) 660 UNTS 195, art 4 (a) . 
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without the consent of the Attorney-General1
37
, which makes sense given the 
Attorney-General ' s unique role in ensuring that legislation does not infringe 
fundamental rights238 . 
It is noteworthy that the Section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 was 
never judicially considered, and that it predecessor, Section 25 of the Race 
Relations Act 1971 , was only considered once by the courts
239
. However, the 
issue in this case was limited to the question whether the phrase "ethnic origin" 
could apply to Jews . 
A Section 131 oftlte Human Rights Act 1993 
The question remains whether Holocaust Denial is capable of falling 
under the requirements of New Zealand ' s hate speech provision. 
1 Effect 
I want to start out with what I would call the effect of the speech in 
question. Section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 is only " triggered" if the 
speech is " threatening, abusive or insulting" 
240
. This is obviously a highly 
subjective element, as the speech could only be one of the above to the targets 
of the speech. One of the problems of this element is that it might turn out to be 
difficult to prove and might in some cases be inconsistent. There is at least a 
possibility that some people might find speech "threatening, abusive or 
insulting", while others might not be offended by the same speech
14 1
. It was 
237 IIuman Rights Act I 993 , s 132 . 
238 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. 
239 King-Ansell v Police, [ 1979] 2 NZLR 53 I. 
2 10 !Iuman Rights Act I 993 , s l 3 1 (I )(a) . 
2 11 Grant IIuscro ft "Defamation , Racial Disham1ony and Freedom of Expression" in Grant 
!Iuscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freddoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights A ct 
1990 and the 1 !11111an Rights .-let 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995), 204 . 
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therefore commented that "the views of the very sensitive are not the 
appropriate yardstick by which to measure whether something is insulting"242 . 
Therefore, the court (or Tribunal) has to determine the view of an ordinary 
sensible citizen to solve the issue2 13_ 
Another prerequisite is that the speech is " likely to excite hostility or 
illwill against, or bring into contempt or ridicule"244 . This requirement reflects 
the real danger of hate speech: That it is capable of influencing the audience 
and to further its spread245 . Accordingly, whether speech is likely to fulfil those 
requirements depends on the likelihood of its audience to be influenced246 . 
2 Intention 
One significant element - and probably the one which is most difficult to 
prove - is the prerequisite of " intent to excite hostility or illwill against, or bring 
into contempt or ridicule any group of persons" 24 7. This is undoubtedly a very 
high threshold of mens rea, and as it is a criminal provision, with good reason . 
However, proving a speaker' s true intention will in some cases be difficult, and 
given the presumption of innocence in some cases maybe even impossible. On 
the other hand, the argument can be made that this requirement protects 
speakers who are simply mislead by others and reasonably believe in the good 
nature of their statements and are thus not lead by hate towards the targets. 
242 Skelton v Sunday Star Times [ I 996] 3 IIRNZ 633 , 660. 
243 Proceedings Co111111is ioner v .-lrcher [ 1996] 3 NRNZ 123, 128. 
214 Human Rights Act 1993, s 13 1. 
245 Gran t J [uscroft "Defamati on , Racial Dishannony and Freedom of Expression" in Grant 
Huscro ft and Pa ul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freddo111s: The 1\ 'ew Zealand Bill of R ights ,-let 
J 990 and the IJ11111 an Rights ;-Jct /993 (Brookers, We ll ington, 1995), 205. 
246 Ibid. 
247 I luman Rights Act 1993, s 13 I 
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3 Defences 
Section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 does not contain any defences. 
It has been commented that this might prove to be problematic, especially since 
the provision in question is a criminal one248 : 
Criminalization is the most extreme form of legislative response to a 
perceived problem, and as such demands the most stringent justification 
where the exercise of fundamental rights is concerned. The need for 
defences under this section is great. 
There is therefore some concern that the provision might be overbroad and 
have a chilling effect on speech that would otherwise be legitimate249 . 
B Holocaust Denial under Section 131 oftlte Human Rights Act 1993 
Given the above stated requirements, it 1s now necessary to examine 
whether they would be met by Holocaust Denial. 
First of all, I have little doubt that Holocaust Denial would "insult" a 
reasonable person, and would even be "abusive" in a wider sense. Denying the 
Holocaust deprives any victim of the Nazi crimes - but not only them; in some 
sort also those who fought to end those crimes in the Second World War - of a 
part of their history. 
Much harder to grasp is the question whether Holocaust Denial is capable 
of being "likely to excite hostility or illwill against, or bring into contempt or 
ridicule any group of persons". The argument could be made, and definitely has 
218 Grant Huscroft "Defamation, Racial Disham1ony and Freedom of Expression" in Grant 
!Iuscroft and Paul Rishworlh (eds) Rights and Freddoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights .,let 
l 990 and the ll11111an Rights 11ct 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995), 205 
2 19 
Ibid; Juliet Moses "Hate Speech : Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" ( 1996) 8 
Auckland ULR 185, 20 I. 
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some merits - that we expect reasonable persons to know enough about the 
Holocaust to not be influenced by that sort of speech. However, seldom will 
those be the target of the speaker. Rather, the experience shows that Holocaust 
Denial is most often targeted at an audience which at least in parts already has 
some sort of bias against Jews (or other victims of the Holocaust). Furthermore, 
the example of Joel Hayward 250 proves that even academics with no anti-
Semitic background - in fact, Joel Hayward claims to have Jewish origins - are 
endangered to be misguided by Holocaust Denial literature. 
As stated above, the intention of a speaker will probably turn out to be 
difficult to prove. However, as discussed at the beginning of this paper
251
, in a 
lot of cases Holocaust Denial will go hand in hand with explicit hatred against 
Jews. Therefore, whilst acknowledging that not in every case the intent can be 
proven, there will remain a significant number of cases where such an intention 
should be not hard to prove. Concerning the "group of ethnic origin", the Court 
of Appeal has left little doubt that the main target of Holocaust Denial , the Jews, 
are a group of ethnic origin and therefore fall under section 131 of the Human 
Rights Act 1993252 . 
Additionally, a close look at the precedents from Canada 
253 and the 
similarity of the legislation 25~ might help. Therefore, the conclusion that 
Holocaust Denial is capable of being hate speech at least in some occasions 
does not seem to be deceptive. 
250 See above, I A 
251 See above, If 
:
52 see: King-rlnse/1 v Police, [ 1979] 2 NZLR 53 1. 
253 R v Keegs tra [ 1990] 3 SCR 697; R v Zundel [ 1992] 2 SCR 73 I ;R v Keegstra I 19961 I SCR 
458. 
:
51 Canadian Criminal Code, s 3 19 (2). 
53 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY 01= WELLINGTON 
IX HATE SPEECH AS A JUSTIFIED LIMIT? 
There can be no doubt that the regulation of hate speech imposes a limit 
on free speech. It has therefore to be determined whether such a limitation 
would be justified in terms of Section 5 of the BORA which provides that255 : 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights , the rights and freedoms contained 
in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
However, as the BORA is not supreme law, Parliament has the power to 
enact provisions that (unjustifiable) limit a right, whereas the courts have no 
power to strike down that legislation256 . 
A General Observation 
To determine whether a limitation on a right is justifiable, the Court of 
Appeal has set out a test in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review 257 
which was just recently affirmed in R v Hansen 2 ' 8 by the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand. This test derives from the decision by the Canadian Supreme 
Court in R v Oakes 159 which dealt with the Canadian provision similar to 
Section 5 BORA which requires limits on rights to be "demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society"260 . The test reads as follows26 1: 
In determining whether an abrogation or limitation of a right or freedom 
can be justified in terms of s 5, it is desirable first to identify the objective 
2
'
5 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
256 Ibid, s 4. 
257 Moonen v Fi/111 and Literature Board of Review (2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 (Tipping J) 
2
'
8 R v Hansen (2007] NZSC 7 
:w R v Oakes [ 1986] I SCR I 03 . 
260 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, enacted 
as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, eh. 11 (UK.), s I . 
26 1 ,\/oonen v Fi/111 & Literal11re Board of Review (2000] 2 NZLR 9. 
54 
which the legislature was endeavouring to achieve by the provision in 
question. The importance and significance of that objective must then be 
assessed. The way in which the objective is statutorily achieved must be in 
reasonable proportion to the importance of the objective. A sledgehammer 
should not be used to crack a nut. The means used must also have a rational 
relationship with the objective, and in achieving the objective there must be 
as little interference as possible with the right or freedom affected. 
Furthermore, the limitation involved must be justifiable in the light of the 
objective. Of necessity value judgments will be involved. In this case it is 
the value to society of freedom of expression, against the value society 
places on protecting children and young persons from exploitation for 
sexual purposes, and on protecting society generally, or sections of it , from 
being exposed to the various kinds of conduct referred to in s 3 of the Act . 
Ultimately, whether the limitation in issue can or cannot be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society is a matter of judgment which the 
Court is obliged to make on behalf of the society which it serves and after 
considering all the issues which may have a bearing on the individual case, 
whether they be social , legal , moral, economic, administrative, ethical or 
otherwise. 
To put it in a nutshell, a limitation on a right is therefore justified, as 
Tipping J stated in R v Hansen, when the "limiting measure serve[s] a purpose 
sufficiently important to justify curtailment of the right or freedom"; when "the 
limiting measure [is] rationally connected with its purpose"; when the "limiting 
measure impair[s] the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for 
sufficient achievement of its purpose" and when "the limit [is] in due 
proportion to the importance of the objective"~62 
262 R vHansen [2007] NZSC 7, at para 104 (Tipping .J) 
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B Application oftlte Test on Hate Speech 
1 Sz1fficient importance of the limiting measure 
First of all it has to be determined whether the limitation of the right to 
freedom of expression is sufficiently important to justify the limitation. The 
objective of hate speech legislation is above all the protection of the society as 
well as of the target groups from the dissemination of hate speech. It was held 
by the Canadian Supreme Court that "an objective relates to concerns which are 
pressing and substantial"c63 . In this paper I have tried to explain some of the 
dangers imposed by the propagation of hate speech. Among others, hate speech 
may cause harm to the targets of the hate speech, most notably psychological 
harm. Targets of hate speech can feel inferior, degraded and denigrated. In the 
case of Holocaust Denial they might feel insulted because they are deprived of 
a part of their history. Additionally, hate speech is capable of reducing the 
relation between target groups and society, and it might harm the society as a 
whole by sending the message that a part of society is inferior to another part. 
This also poses the danger of leading to further hostility and discrimination. 
Hate speech is and should therefore be of great social concern and thus is of 
sufficient importance. 
2 Rahonal connection between limiting measure and its pwpose 
As stated above, the purpose of the hate speech provision is to protect the 
targets as well as society. Legislation should be "carefully designed" and 
neither arbitrary or unfair c61 . As the provision contains the requirement of 
"intent", there is little danger that it might be used to cover situations which are 
beyond the purpose of the legislation. I am therefore satisfied that the criminal 
263 R v Oakes [ I 986] I SCR I 03 , 138. 
c61 R v Oakes [ I 986] I SCR I 03 , 13 9. 
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prov1s10n of the Human Rights Act 1993 is in rational connection with its 
objective; the protection of society and target groups. 
3 Reasonable little inte1ference 
The interference with the right or freedom of expression is as little as 
possible if there was no alternative that was less intrusive but which would have 
a similar level of effectiveness"65 . Overseas experiences show that hate mongers 
will stop at nothing to spread their hatred. Through the requirement of intent it 
is ensured that only ill-willed speakers will be prosecuted; and the requirement 
of the Attorney-General ' s consent enhances that precautious approach . I can see 
of no measurement which would be capable of having a similar effect on people 
willing to spread their hate. The interference with freedom of expression is 
therefore as little as possible . 
.J Proportionality 
The probably decisive portion of the test is the decision whether a 
limitation is reasonably proportional to the importance of the objective266 . As 
outlined above, hate speech - and thus under certain circumstances Holocaust 
Denial - is capable of causing serious harm not only to its targets, but also to 
society as a whole and the democratic process. Therefore, under my 
understanding of the right to freedom of expression, the limitation imposed on 
the right by a reasonable hate speech provision like Section 131 of the Human 
Rights Act 1993 is significantly outweighed by the possible harm. Through the 
requirement of intention by the speaker and the requirement of the Attorney-
General ' s consent it is guaranteed that legitimate speech dri ven by no bad 
265 R v !Jansen l2007] NZSC 7, al para 217 (McGra th J). 
266 J\foonen v Fi/111 and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16- 17 (T ipping J). 
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intentions as well as speech that might be in the public interest will not be 
censored. 
5 Inter;m result 
The limitation on freedom of expression imposed by the hate speech 
prov1s1on of Section 131 Human Rights Act 1993 appears therefore to be 
justified in light of Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. However, even if a 
court would find an unjustified limitation, Section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act 
1990 would still require the court to apply the hate speech provision. 
X CONCLUSION 
Starting out with the research for this paper, my mind was pretty much set 
on a result: That Holocaust Denial is so evil and ill-minded that everybody who 
even dares to question any aspect of the Holocaust must and should be 
prosecuted, and that New Zealand ' s law had to be amended. Now, at the end of 
the research, I am not so sure anymore. 
As concluded throughout the paper, prosecution of Holocaust Denial faces 
multiple problems. The first big one is the one described as the dilemma of 
proof If there is no way of taking some sort of judicial notice of the Holocaust, 
the prosecution will be used by either intelligent deniers, or by their lawyers, 
who regularly have a history of denial themselves, to put the Holocaust itself on 
trial every time we go to court. The only possibility I see to avoid that in an 
adversarial country would be to use the by now numerous precedents. The 
problem of debating the Holocaust in court and allowing deniers a forum to 
publicly express their views is one of the reasons why some researches - among 
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them Deborah Lipstadt267 or the Institute for Jewish Policy Research268, to name 
just a few- are not in favour of Holocaust Denial prosecution . 
The biggest issue at stake is however freedom of expression. We are 
however not overly worried about outlawing defamation, some sorts of 
pornography or even hate speech, with the latter one still being the most 
discussed of those issues . I for my part struggle with seeing the real differences 
there. Professor Jeremy Waldron stated269 : 
[ .. . ] the issue is not just our learning to tolerate thought that we hate [ ... ]. 
The harm that expressions of racial hatred do is harm in the first instance to 
the groups who are denounced or bestialized in pamphlets, billboards, talk 
radio , and biogs. It is not harm - if I can put it bluntly - to the white 
liberals who find the racist invective distasteful. Maybe we should admire 
some lawyer who says he hates what the racist says but defends to the 
death hi s right to say it , but thi s sort of intellectual resilience is not what's 
at issue . The question is about the direct targets of the abuse . Can their 
lives be led, can their children be brought up, can their hopes be maintained 
and their worst fears dispelled, in a social environment polluted by these 
materials? Those are the concerns that need to be answered[ ... ]. 
In my eyes, prosecution of Holocaust Denial is not so much about truth or 
the suppression of the search for truth . It is much more about the underlying 
hate. This said I have to acknowledge that the German Criminal Law as well as 
the proposed European Law appears at first glance to be too broad, as they 
punish the pure denial as opposed to the underlying hate. In the end however 
the distinction is probably just a theoretical one. In Europe, with the memories 
of the Holocaust and the Nazi Regime still very much alive, it is nearly 
impossible to think of a denier who does not deny out of hate. 
267 Robert Kahn / fo/o ca11sl Denial and the law (Palgrave McMillan, New York, 2004), 12 . 
268 Sec note 10. 
269 Jeremy Waldron "Free Speech & the Menace of Ilysteria" (2008) 55 The New York Review 
40, 44. 
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This leads to the way New Zealand ought in my view deal with deniers 
such as Irving"70 or Zundel. In my eyes - and coming back to the statement at 
the beginning of this conclusion I am pleasantly surprised by that - New 
Zealand's law would be fully capable of dealing with deniers. Furthermore, the 
requirement of "intention" makes it an even better law than Germany's 
legislation. Under German law, Joel Hayward would most probably have been 
convicted for the incitement of racial hatred. The German Criminal Code allows 
no other interpretation. New Zealand's law though would be capable of 
distinguishing between a young man who is simply mislead - and as hard as it 
is to believe that he was just "wrong"; Joel Hayward deserves the benefit of the 
doubt - and people who aim at spreading hate. It is however a bit worrying that 
New Zealand 's hate speech provisions have only been invoked once. One might 
hope that this is because New Zealand has no problems with hate speech, 
however, the number of 2017 race-based complaints to the Human Rights 
Commission271 suggests otherwise. 
I have argued in this paper that the prosecution of hate speech, and 
especially Holocaust Denial, should prevail over the nevertheless important 
right to freedom of expression. I would therefore wish - albeit the 
aforementioned risks of prosecution - that the Attorney-General would use his 
powers to invoke this important piece of legislation. It would be desirable if 
society - and the Attorney General - could see Holocaust Denial as what it in 
most instances is: An extremely perfidious form of hate speech. 
270 
Note: David Irving has previously been denied entry to New Zealand; see: Green Party Press 
Release "Irving decision is a blow for free speech" ava ilable at http://\\\\\\ .scoop.co.111,/ (last 
accessed 28 September 2008). 
:
7 1 Human Rights Commission ''Annual Report for the Year 2007" 29. 
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Appendix: 
Section 130 oftlte German Criminal Code: Incitement oftlte Peop/en 
I Whoever, in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public peace 
1 incites hatred against segments of the population or calls for violent 
or arbitrary measures against them; or 
2 assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously 
maligning, or defaming segments of the population, 
shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to five years. 
II Whoever: 
1 with respect to writings (Section 11 subsection (3)), which incite 
hatred against segments of the population or a national, racial or 
religious group, or one characterized by its folk customs, which call 
for violent or arbitrary measures against them, or which assault the 
human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning or 
defaming segments of the population or a previously indicated group: 
a disseminates them; 
b publicly displays, posts, presents, or otherwise makes them 
accessible; 
2n Translati on by author 
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c offers, gives or makes accessible to a person under eighteen 
years; or 
d produces, obtains, supplies, stocks, offers, announces, 
commends, undertakes to import or export them, in order to 
use them or copies obtained from them within the meaning of 
numbers a through c or facilitate such use by another; or 
2 disseminates a presentation of the content indicated in number 1 by 
radio, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of not more than three years or a 
fine. 
III Whoever publicly or in an assembly approves, denies or renders harmless 
an act committed under the rule of National Socialism of the type 
indicated in Section 6 subsection (1) of the International Criminal Code 
(VStGB), in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace shall be 
punished with imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine. 
IV Whoever publicly or in an assembly approves, renders harmless or 
justifies the national socialistic tyranny and arbitrariness in a manner 
capable of disturbing the public peace by harming the dignity of the 
victims, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than 3 years or 
a fine. 
V Subsection (II) shall also apply to writings (Section 11 subsection (3)) 
with content such as is indicated in subsection (III). 
YI In cases under subsection (II), also in conjunction with subsection (IV), 
and in cases of subsection (III), Section 86 subsection (III) , shall apply 
correspondingly. 
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